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Forthcoming, Supreme Court Review (2015) 
 
This article recovers the institutional alternatives to judicial enforcement 
of civil liberties during the New Deal. Based on archival research, it 
demonstrates that the court-based strategy was deeply contested and remained 
controversial well after the foundational First Amendment victories. Today, 
theories of civil liberties are premised on state neutrality in the domain of public 
debate; in the 1930s, the most prominent accounts demanded affirmative 
government intervention to correct distortions in the marketplace of ideas or to 
advance substantive rights. In examining these forgotten traditions, the article 
highlights the close and unexplored connection between civil liberties and 
organized labor during the New Deal. Surprisingly, early proponents of civil 
liberties understood the term to encompass, above all, the rights to organize, 
picket, and strike. Reconstructing the competing visions of civil liberties and their 
optimal enforcement before and after the “Constitutional Revolution” reveals the 
anticipated trade-offs of the judicial strategy, with important implications for 
theoretical accounts of constitutional change.  
 
Confidence in liberal legalism as a framework for social change appears to 
be in a period of decline. In areas ranging from same-sex marriage to racial 
equality, recent decades have witnessed a resurgence of interest in extrajudicial 
strategies for advancing civil rights. Debates over popular constitutionalism and 
calls for constitutional amendment and judicial restraint manifest a growing 
aversion to the court-centered rights mobilization that dominated legal academia 
and the liberal imagination for almost half a century.1  
                                                
1 The vast literature includes works from a variety of disciplinary and methodological 
perspectives, including Gerald N. Rosenberg, The Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social 
Change? (Chicago 1991); William Forbath, Law and the Shaping of the American Labor 
Movement (Harvard 1991); Michael McCann, Rights at Work: Pay Equity Reform and the Politics 
of Legal Mobilization (Chicago 1994); Cass R. Sunstein, One Case at a Time: Judicial 
Minimalism on the Supreme Court (Harvard 1999); Mark Tushnet, Taking the Constitution Away 
from the Courts (Princeton 1999); Jack Balkin and Sanford Levinson, Understanding the 
Constitutional Revolution, 87 Va L Rev 1045 (2001); Michael Klarman, From Jim Crow to Civil 
Rights: The Supreme Court and the Struggle for Racial Equality (Oxford 2004); Larry Kramer, 
The People Themselves (Oxford 2004); Catherine Albiston, The Dark Side of Litigation as a 
Social Movement Strategy, 96 Iowa L Rev B 61  (2011); John Paul Stevens, Six Amendments: 
How and Why We Should Change the Constitution (Little, Brown and Company 2014). On the 
relationship between adjudication and popular constitutionalism, see Robert Post and Reva Siegel, 
Roe Rage: Democratic Constitutionalism and Backlash, 42 Harv CR-CL L Rev 373 (2007). 
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Even in the domain of First Amendment protection for free speech—long 
considered an unassailable case for robust judicial review—the Warren Court 
consensus has begun to crumble. From the Second World War until the Rehnquist 
Court, it was an article of faith among activists and academics that a strong First 
Amendment would preserve a platform for transformative political ideas. In an 
era when state and federal actors targeted radical agitators, civil rights protestors, 
and anti-war demonstrators, the Supreme Court was comparatively (if unevenly) 
friendly to the rights of dissenters. In the 1980s and 1990s, however, a growing 
chorus of legal scholars described a shift in First Amendment law from the 
protection of disfavored minorities against state suppression to the insulation of 
industrial interests against government regulation.2   
Over time, such appraisals have become more prevalent and more frenzied. 
Today, a broad range of legal scholars and cultural critics decry the Court’s 
“Lochnerization” of the First Amendment: its persistent invalidation of legislative 
and administrative efforts to temper corporate dominance, and its use of the First 
Amendment to undermine federal programs or to qualify public sector collective 
bargaining agreements.3 They lament its simultaneous retreat from involvement in 
mitigating poverty, expanding equality, and securing economic justice. They have 
urged judicial deference toward democratic efforts to balance competing 
constitutional values, within and outside the First Amendment context.  
Students of the First Amendment may be surprised to discover well 
developed antecedents of such critiques in the modern history of free speech.4  
They have accepted two basic premises that have distorted their historical 
understanding and colored their consideration of potential paths forward. First, 
they have presupposed a well established tradition of progressive support for free 
                                                
2 See, for example, Owen Fiss, Liberalism Divided (Westview 1996); Cass R. Sunstein, 
Democracy and the Problem of Free Speech (The Free Press 1993); Mark A. Graber, 
Transforming Free Speech: The Ambiguous Legacy of Civil Libertarianism (University of 
California 1991); Morton Horwitz, Foreword: The Constitution of Change, 107 Harv L Rev 30, 
Section The Lochnerization of the First Amendment at 109 (1993). Commentators have lamented 
the tendency of the Supreme Court to uphold and extend unfettered participation in the 
marketplace of ideas at the expense of meaningful access for underfunded and underrepresented 
speakers. 
3 In addition to the campaign finance cases, see Hobby Lobby; the DC Circuit’s recent 
decision in National Association of Manufacturers v SEC; and especially Harris v Quinn.  
4 The extensive literature on constitutionalism outside the courts has largely neglected the 
First Amendment. The principal exception is Paul Horwitz, First Amendment Institutions (Harvard 
2013), which focuses on non-state institutions. Cf. Frederick Schauer, Towards an Institutional 
First Amendment, 89 Minn L Rev 1256 (2005) (arguing for greater judicial attention to 
institutional difference in First Amendment analysis). Work on civil liberties and congressional 
constitutionalism has focused on the Speech or Debate Clause or, like other scholarship, has 
regarded the First Amendment as a potential barrier to congressional activity in other domains. 
E.g., Josh Chafetz, Congress's Constitution, 160 U Pa L Rev 715 (2012); David Currie, The 
Constitution in Congress (Chicago 1997).  In the administrative context, Reuel Schiller has argued 
that agency interpretations have informed judicial doctrine. Reuel E. Schiller, Free Speech and 
Expertise: Administrative Censorship and the Birth of the Modern First Amendment, 86 Va L Rev 
1, 3–4, 101 (2000).  
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speech, at least after the First World War demonstrated the dangers of 
government censorship.5 That is, they have imagined the expansion of First 
Amendment protections beginning with the famous Holmes and Brandeis dissents 
as a victory for advocates of oppressed groups. Second, and relatedly, they have 
assumed that conservatives resisted free speech claims in the late 1930s, as they 
had during World War I and as they would during the Cold War. Because the 
judiciary’s retreat from judicial review in economic cases corresponded to a new 
vigilance with respect to free speech and “discrete and insular minorities,” they 
regard both halves of the New Deal Settlement as repudiations of the Right.  
Both of those assumptions are incomplete. In other work, I argue that 
conservatives were a key constituency of the New Deal coalition responsible for 
securing strong First Amendment rights in the courts. In this Article, I address the 
corresponding lack of enthusiasm for a court-centered First Amendment strategy 
among a substantial subset of liberal New Dealers. Then, as now, many critics of 
a comparatively conservative Court preferred to pursue their agenda outside the 
judiciary.  
Moreover, faith in the First Amendment during the New Deal did not 
necessarily entail a preference for judicial enforcement. Some New Dealers who 
advocated state protection of social and economic rights perceived a strong First 
Amendment as a threat to their legislative agenda and thus opposed free speech as 
a constitutional value altogether. Others, however, regarded unfettered 
deliberation as a normatively and constitutionally necessary prerequisite for 
democratic rights but nonetheless rejected the courts as the primary institution for 
implementing the First Amendment.  Still others turned to the judiciary for 
validation of free speech claims, but in a manner quite foreign from today’s 
defensive practices. Rather than invoking the First Amendment as a shield against 
government infringement, they urged and secured federal prosecution of local 
officials and even private actors who curtailed expressive freedom. 
That these disparate approaches have been forgotten owes in significant part 
to a terminological misunderstanding.  Between the Second New Deal and the 
Second World War, the courts emerged as the legitimate locus of interpretive 
authority in the domain of rights that eventually occupied the category “civil 
liberties.” Although it has no specific doctrinal significance, that phrase has come 
to encompass a recognizable and distinctive set of legal rights. Those rights 
ordinarily include the freedom of speech and religion, the procedural rights of 
criminal defendants, perhaps reproductive rights or the right to bear arms. Such 
rights, as they are conventionally understood, are asserted to block the state. They 
are invoked in court by private actors—individuals and their representatives—
often in the course of a criminal prosecution. They are routinely described, albeit 
                                                
5 The observation that progressives were skeptical of First Amendment claims by pacifists and 
radicals during World War I is a distinct claim. David M. Rabban, Free Speech in Its Forgotten 
Years, 1870-1920 (Cambridge 1997); Graber; Weinrib, From Public Interest to Private Rights (34 
L & Soc Inq 187 (2009).  
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contentiously, as “negative” rather than “positive.”6  Health care, old-age security, 
or a living wage may be desirable policy goals, but they are not now considered 
civil liberties.7  
During the New Deal, by contrast, the designation was capacious enough to 
encompass all these rights and more. Progressives, conservatives, radicals, and 
liberals espoused antithetical views of state power, social and economic ordering, 
and individual rights. And yet all framed their programs in civil liberties terms. 
When scholars today see endorsements of “civil liberties” in judicial opinions, 
administrative records, and congressional debates, they assume that New Deal 
actors meant to invoke a basically compatible set of constitutional principles. 
Occasionally, contemporaneous observers made the same mistake.  
In reality, celebrants of civil liberties were advancing distinct positions, 
even when they shared a set of overarching social and economic goals.  There was 
only one legal and policy commitment that all placed squarely under the label 
they championed: the right of workers to engage in “peaceful” picketing.8 The 
                                                
6 On the “controversy surrounding the positive-negative distinction,” see Emily Zackin, 
Looking for Rights in All the Wrong Places: Why State Constitutions Contain America’s Positive 
Rights, 42-47 (Princeton 2013). While acknowledging the role of government in enforcing 
“negative” rights and in shaping putatively private relationships, Zackin provides a compelling 
argument for the use of the terms “positive” and “negative” in the context of American 
constitutional history: “[A]t the level of their lived experiences, the activists who shaped state 
constitutions perceived an important difference between governmental action and restraint. They 
also distinguished between threats posed directly by government itself and dangers that stemmed 
from other sources.” Id at 45. The same might be said of the civil liberties advocates described in 
this Article. In 1935, David J. Saposs drew on the terms to describe AFL-style labor voluntarism. 
He explained: “The workers were especially tutored to eschew becoming the ‘wards of the state’ 
by shunning legislation and other forms of government intervention in labor matters. Only 
legislation of a negative intent was to be acceptable.” With the exception of legislation affecting 
women and children, “positive legislation,” that is, “legislation whereby the government directly 
takes a hand in improving working conditions, such as social insurance, minimum wage, 
limitations on the hours of work … [was] bound to corrupt and weaken the workers’ reliance upon 
their voluntary economic organizations, the unions.” David J. Saposs, “The American Labor 
Movement Since the War,” 49 Q J Econ 236, 237 (1935). 
7 The Court’s reluctance to protect socioeconomic rights has been a distinguishing feature of 
American constitutionalism. See, eg, Martha Nussbaum, “Foreword: Constitutions and 
Capabilities: ‘Perception’ Against Lofty Formalism,’” 121 Harv L Rev 4, 57 (2007); Frank I. 
Michelman, “Socioeconomic Rights in Constitutional Law: Explaining America Away” (2008); 
Cass R. Sunstein, “Why Does the American Constitution Lack Social and Economic Guarantees?” 
(2005). In the First Amendment context, a socioeconomic view has been particularly disfavored. 
See, eg, Frederick Schauer, “The Exceptional First Amendment,” in American Exceptionalism and 
Human Rights (Princeton 2005), 46 (“The Constitution of the United States is a strongly negative 
constitution, and viewing a constitution as the vehicle for ensuring social rights, community rights, 
or positive citizen entitlements of any kind is, for better or for worse, highly disfavored…And 
while the libertarian culture that such attitudes of distrust engender is hardly restricted to freedom 
of communication, this skepticism about the ability of any governmental institution reliably to 
distinguish the good from the bad, the true from the false, and the sound from the unsound finds 
its most comfortable home in the First Amendment”). 
8 Participants defined “peaceful” in a variety of ways. For some, the term excluded mass 
picketing and methods defined as coercive under the common law.  
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subsequent relegation of labor activity to second-class status under the First 
Amendment renders that single commonality almost inconceivable in retrospect.9  
During the 1920s, however, an unlikely coalition of lawyers and activists led by 
the American Civil Liberties Union had made the right to organize central to the 
definition of civil liberties. For a variety of reasons—some theoretical, some 
opportunistic—all embraced what Justice Frank Murphy would call “the right to 
discuss freely industrial relations which are matters of public concern.”10 There 
was marked disagreement over the ideological justification for that conclusion, as 
well as the larger bundle of rights from which the rights of labor derived.  
When New Deal liberals spoke in terms of civil liberties, they were laying 
claim to a label that had recently come to be viewed as normatively desirable and 
central to American governance. The content of that category remained 
ambiguous, but for much of the decade, among most of the groups who invoked 
it, it was linked to economic justice.  Disparate competencies and areas of focus 
led competing advocates and institutions to envision the evils of modern society 
in different ways. In claiming to be the true defenders of civil liberties, and in 
defining the optimal enforcement of those rights, those actors wrestled over the 
contours of constitutional democracy in the United States. They expressed their 
clashing conceptions through a common vocabulary, but they voiced opposing 
judgments about which rights took priority and how they should be secured.  
The vision of civil liberties that prevailed in the late New Deal established 
the judiciary as a check on majoritarian democracy and administrative discretion. 
State action was its target, not its engine. Civil liberties enforcement was a species 
of judicial review that closely resembled substantive due process—that is, it 
curtailed government’s power to interfere with “private” behavior, without 
disturbing the legal framework through which market power was allocated and 
preserved—a feature that industry understood and quickly endorsed. I describe 
this constellation of commitments as the liberal vision of civil liberties. Its central 
pillar was the First Amendment.  
But this narrow adherence to a state-constraining Bill of Rights was the 
terminus of the New Deal interpretive struggle rather than its origin. The goal of 
this Article is to recover an earlier, more capacious moment, when the meaning of 
“civil liberties” was fluid and porous. Understanding how particular objectives 
and ideas were excluded from its purview yields important insights into the 
perceived advantages and limitations of the modern First Amendment, as well as 
the larger universe of strategies for social and constitutional change outside the 
courts. Many of the approaches advanced and tested during the New Deal 
resonate with current proposals. Others are scarcely recognizable as theoretical 
possibilities.  
                                                
9 See, eg, Kenneth G. Dau-Schmidt et al, Labor Law in the Contemporary Workplace, 711 
(West 2d ed 2014) (“labor union speech receives less First Amendment protection than that of 
other activists”).  
10 Thornhill v Alabama, 310 US 88 (1940). 
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Drawing on archival materials, including unpublished organizational 
records, government documents, and personal correspondence, this Article 
introduces an unfamiliar account of the articulation and enforcement of civil 
liberties during the 1930s. Its major players are government actors and private 
organizations. The ACLU, whose deep state-skepticism initially stemmed from 
the tenets of radical trade unionism, framed popular and judicial understandings 
of civil liberties in the interwar period and after. The account of civil liberties that 
the organization espoused and the Court eventually accepted reflected a strategic 
partnership with such unlikely entities as the American Bar Association and the 
American Liberty League. Meanwhile, many of the ACLU’s liberal and labor 
allies broke with the organization over its increasing reliance on judicial review. 
The labor movement, after all, had railed for more than a century at its ill 
treatment by the courts.11 For their part, the New Deal reformers who called for 
active intervention in the economy also demanded active intervention on behalf of 
disfavored ideas. They advocated adjustments in the marketplace of ideas to 
correct distortions stemming from inequality of access or relative power. And 
many sought to implement that vision in spite of, rather than through, the courts. 
The first Part identifies four discrete visions of civil liberties in circulation 
among advocates and government actors during the New Deal: a radical, state-
skeptical vision rooted in the “direct action” of militant trade unionism; a 
progressive vision premised on deliberative openness in the formulation of public 
policy; a conservative vision that linked economic liberty to the Bill of Rights; 
and a labor interventionist vision that regarded state support of collective 
bargaining as instrumental to achieving material social and economic goals. By 
the late New Deal, these competing understandings yielded to a synthetic, liberal 
vision that privileged judicial enforcement.  
Part II then takes up, in turn, the practice of civil liberties enforcement 
within four New Deal institutions that vied for interpretive power. The Supreme 
Court was sympathetic to state efforts to effectuate labor’s rights even while it 
constrained the government’s ability to target the coercive effects of workers’ 
(and eventually, employers’) concerted activity.  The Senate Civil Liberties 
Committee sponsored legislation to safeguard labor’s organizational activity 
against intervention by both government and employers. The National Labor 
Relations Board subordinated free speech to the right to organize and legitimated 
state intervention with expression that exercised a coercive effect due to 
disparities in bargaining power. Finally, the Civil Liberties Unit within the 
Department of Justice imagined workers’ associational rights as part of a broader 
constellation of freedoms enforceable, with state assistance, against recalcitrant 
employers and the local officials who countenanced their illegal practices. For the 
                                                
11 See, eg, William E. Forbath, Law and the Shaping of the American Labor Movement 
(Harvard 1991); Christopher L. Tomlins, Law, Labor and Ideology in the Early American 
Republic (Cambridge 1992); Victoria C. Hattam, Labor Visions and State Power: The Origins of 
Business Unionism in the United States (Princeton 1993); Daniel R. Ernst, Lawyers Against Labor 
(Illinois 1995).  
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administrative actors discussed in this Article, the modal civil liberties were 
workers’ rights to organize, boycott, and strike. The labor-centric view contended 
with other alternatives, however, which foregrounded individual autonomy in 
place of group rights. 
In Part III, I draw several tentative conclusions from these historical 
materials with respect to the relationship between institutional constraints and the 
pursuit of particular rights. Sometimes, the institutional actors featured in this 
Article operated at cross purposes. Often, their efforts overlapped. All proved to 
be responsive to popular pressures and yet capable of resisting public opinion to 
protect disfavored rights claimants against both government and private 
repression. And yet, it is possible to identify some salient differences between 
them, including, most notably, their respective attitudes toward state power. 
As a matter of historical circumstance, the theory of civil liberties that 
prevailed during the New Deal foregrounded the courts as a check on state abuses. 
During the 1930s, the judiciary emerged for the first time as a potential guardian 
and even emblem of personal freedom. Reconstructing the alternative visions of 
civil liberties and their optimal enforcement reveals the anticipated advantages of 
the judicial strategy as well as its costs.  That undertaking should matter to 
constitutional theorists as much as historians. 
 
I. Visions of Civil Liberties During the New Deal 
In May 1937, just one month after the Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the National Labor Relations Act,12 the American Civil 
Liberties Union issued a report on the merits of judicial review. Its subject was 
only incidentally the Court’s persistent invalidation of New Deal economic 
legislation, which prompted President Franklin D. Roosevelt’s ill-fated Judicial 
Procedures Reform Bill.13 Instead, the ACLU’s report on the Court-packing 
plan—prepared by Osmond Fraenkel, a member of the Board of Directors and the 
ACLU’s Supreme Court litigator—addressed the question “how far the Court has 
been a defender of civil liberties.” To that end, it evaluated the Court’s record 
since the nineteenth century.14 It concluded that the Court had “more often failed 
to protect the Bill of Rights than preserve it,” and that those decisions favorable to 
civil liberties involved “less important issues.” Still, the Court had begun to 
protect “personal rights” (a term encompassing privacy, bodily integrity, and 
                                                
12 NLRB v Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, 301 US 1 (1937).   
13 On the constitutional revolution, see William E. Leuchtenburg, The Supreme Court Reborn: 
The Constitutional Revolution in the Age of Roosevelt (Oxford 1995); Barry Cushman, Rethinking 
the New Deal Court: The Structure of a Constitutional Revolution (Oxford 1998); Richard A. 
Maidment, The Judicial Response to the New Deal: The United States Supreme Court and 
Economic Regulation, 1934–1936 (St. Martin’s 1991); Alan Brinkley, The End of Reform: New 
Deal Liberalism in Recession and War (Knopf 1995). 
14 It tallied the Court’s decisions in such far-ranging areas as military trials, slavery or 
peonage, searches and seizures, freedom of religion, education, aliens and citizenship, freedom of 
speech, and labor relations. 
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expressive freedom) more vigilantly as a result of its “widening conception” of 
the due process clause.15 As Fraenkel reflected in comments to the ACLU Board, 
“so long as we believe in safeguarding the rights of minorities, the power of 
review is essential to protect these rights.”16 
The ACLU’s report is a striking document. It represents the organization’s 
effort to grapple with one of the most divisive questions facing social movements 
and sympathetic government officials during the 1930s: whether efforts to defend 
political minorities and facilitate economic change should proceed through the 
legislature, government agencies, or the courts. That question was intimately 
bound up with an equally fundamental debate over how civil liberties should be 
defined and what goals and values they served.17  
To assess the field, the organization administered a survey to prominent 
legal authorities, soliciting their views on the implications for civil liberties 
(without defining that term) of various proposals to limit judicial review. Walter 
Gellhorn, an administrative law scholar who was then serving as regional attorney 
for the Social Security system, believed the courts could be constrained without 
significant danger to civil liberties. Lloyd Garrison, dean of the University of 
Wisconsin Law School and the first chair of the original NLRB, was somewhat 
friendlier to judicial involvement, and he cautioned against “giving majorities too 
much say over minorities.”18 Edwin Borchard, a law professor at Yale, thought it 
“apparent that the current danger is an expansion of the executive power into 
dictatorship”—and he considered the Supreme Court to be “the greatest safeguard 
we have against executive arbitrariness.”19 The socialist leader and Presbyterian 
                                                
15 ACLU Press Release, 21 May 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 143, vol. 978. According to 
Fraenkel, the Supreme Court had “spoken strongly against federal laws restricting civil liberties” 
only once, in Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866).  Felix Cohen went further. By his interpretation 
of the case law, “No person deprived of any civil liberty by an oppressive act of Congress has ever 
received any help from the Supreme Court. On the other hand, when Congress has extended aid to 
those deprived of civil liberties, the Supreme Court, in five cases out of seven, has nullified the aid 
that Congress tendered.” Felix Cohen to Osmond Fraenkel, 24 April 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 
143, vol. 978. 
16 Preliminary Report of the American Civil Liberties Union Temporary Committee 
Concerning the Supreme Court, ACLU Papers, reel 143, vol. 978. 
17 See Laura Weinrib, The Liberal Compromise: Civil Liberties, Labor, and the Limits of State 
Power, 1917–1940 (PhD diss., Princeton University, 2011); Emily Zackin, Popular 
Constitutionalism’s Hard When You’re Not Very Popular: Why the ACLU Turned to the Courts, L 
& Soc Rev 42 (2008), 367–96. In the wake of the First World War, the nascent civil liberties 
movement had sought unsuccessfully to secure its agenda through propaganda and popular 
persuasion. Its constituents subsequently experimented with a range of top-down methods for 
cabining state repression—including, but not limited to, a court-based approach—despite 
conflicting conceptions of government’s appropriate reach. Even in the domain of legal argument, 
its early victories were rarely decided on constitutional grounds; rather, civil liberties advocates 
counseled prosecutorial restraint and, in court, argued that criminal statutes and the common law 
contained safe harbors for dissenting views. By the end of the 1920s, however, civil liberties 
advocates increasingly pressed, and occasionally won, constitutional claims. 
18 Ibid.  
19 Edwin Borchard to Osmond Fraenkel, 4 February 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 143, vol. 978. 
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minister Norman Thomas favored a constitutional amendment clarifying 
congressional power to legislate in “economic and social matters” and restricting 
judicial review exclusively in those domains.20 These respondents and others 
uniformly endorsed civil liberties, but they differed profoundly with respect to the 
content of the rights they defended, the source of the threat to those rights, and the 
best means of preserving them. 
In contrast to liberals’ ambivalence, mainstream conservatives and the 
American Bar Association publicly celebrated the Supreme Court’s recent 
decisions upholding (if tepidly) free speech and the rights of criminal 
defendants—decisions, that is, in cases argued by Fraenkel and the ACLU, which 
most members of the bar had staunchly opposed when they were handed down. 
Newly converted, the ABA proclaimed to radio audiences that the Supreme Court 
had proven its worth by defending personal and property rights alike. To 
Fraenkel, that was precisely the problem. “Since property can defend itself more 
effectively,” he cautioned, “administrative officials and lower courts follow the 
Supreme Court more consistently in protecting property than personal rights.” 
The result was that “the fight for personal rights has constantly to be fought 
over.”21  
Historians and constitutional scholars have approached New Deal 
perspectives on the First Amendment through an unduly narrow lens—a focus 
shaped by the state-skeptical and court-centered vision of civil liberties that 
ultimately prevailed. They have looked for struggles over the appropriate scope of 
state power to curb advocacy and expression, framed as a contest between 
national security or the public interest, on the one hand, and individual autonomy 
or deliberative openness on the other. They have found them in the seminal First 
Amendment cases that populate the pages of constitutional law casebooks.  
Certainly these familiar battles over seditious speech were understood by 
many New Dealers as important civil liberties concerns. To cabin civil liberties in 
this way, however, is anachronistic. During the 1930s, the meaning of civil 
liberties was in flux. More to the point, it was vehemently contested. Whatever 
their underlying objectives, advocates across the political spectrum defended them 
in civil liberties terms. To some, civil liberties were constraints on state power; to 
others, they served as a basis for state intervention against private abuses or 
economic inequality. Civil liberties might undercut administrative discretion or 
justify government intrusions. By the end of the decade, even constituencies that 
had long decried free speech as a cover for subversive activity claimed the mantle 
of civil liberties as their own.  
This convergence reflects a common engagement with (if not a shared 
solution to) a basic New Deal problem, namely, the appropriate balance between 
state power and individual rights in a period of rapid government growth. Under 
the rubric of civil liberties, New Deal insiders and sympathizers debated such far-
                                                
20 Norman Thomas to Roger Baldwin, 25 February 1937, ACLU Papers, reel 142, vol. 969.  
21 ACLU Press Release, 21 May 1937, reel 143, vol. 978. 
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ranging issues as anti-lynching legislation, tribal autonomy for American Indians, 
expansion of political asylum, transfer of colonial possessions from naval to 
civilian rule, and the rights of the unemployed. At an ACLU-sponsored 
conference on Civil Liberties Under the New Deal in 1934, representatives from 
such groups as the International Labor Defense, the National Urban League, and 
the NAACP discussed legislative proposals to expand asylum for political 
refugees, provide jury trials in postal censorship cases, and criminalize lynching 
under federal law.22 Although they “showed surprising unanimity of opinion on 
fundamentals,”23 delegates clashed over the desirability of federal regulation of 
radio content—including a requirement to allocate equal radio airtime to all sides 
of controversial questions—and the tradeoffs between private and public 
control.24 Over the course of the decade, self-described civil liberties advocates 
would split over anti-fascist security measures, the extension of free speech to 
Nazi marches, and the propriety of racial discrimination in public 
accommodations. 
If there was a single issue, however, that most poignantly foregrounded the 
costs and benefits of an interventionist state vis-à-vis personal rights, it was the 
labor question.25 Between the First World War and the New Deal, the modern 
civil liberties movement evolved from a radical fringe group espousing labor’s 
right of revolution to a mainstream exponent of widely held (if inconsistently 
enforced) principles of constitutional democracy.  The primary architect of that 
feat was the ACLU. After an unsuccessful stint as a “frankly partisan[]” labor 
adjunct,26  the organization had extended its operations into such areas as 
academic freedom, artistic expression, and sex education, in which broad-based 
consensus was feasible.27 When it solicited assistance in labor cases during the 
                                                
22 Memorandum of Bills Proposed for Discussion, Conference on Civil Liberties under the 
New Deal, ACLU Papers, reel 110, vol. 719.  
23 ACLU Press Bulletin 643, 14 December 1934, ACLU Papers, reel 110, vol. 721.  
24 Eg, Louis G. Caldwell, “Excerpts from ‘Freedom on the Air,’” Conference on Civil 
Liberties and the New Deal, ACLU Papers, reel 110, vol. 721. 
25 Although historians have largely neglected the labor history of the modern civil liberties 
movement, there is an extensive bibliography on efforts by the labor movement to mobilize 
constitutional rights, including free speech, during earlier periods (especially before World War I). 
The most famous examples are the IWW’s Free Speech Fights and the AFL’s boycott campaign. 
See, e.g., David M. Rabban, Free Speech in Its Forgotten Years, 1870-1920 (Cambridge 1997); 
John Wertheimer, Free Speech Fights: The Roots of Modern Free-Expression Litigation in the 
United States (Ph.D, diss., Princeton University, 1992); Melvyn Dubofsky, We Shall Be All: A 
History of the Industrial Workers of the World (Quadrangle  1969); Philip S. Foner, History of the 
Labor Movement, vol. 9, The T.U.E.L. to The End of the Gompers Era (New York: International 
Publishers, 1991); Philip S. Foner, ed., Fellow Workers and Friends: I.W.W. Free Speech Fights 
as Told by Participants (Greenwood  1981); Glen J. Broyles, The Spokane Free-Speech Fight, 
1909–1910: A Study in IWW Tactics, Labor History 19 (Spring 1978): 238–52; Stewart Bird, Dan 
Georgakas, and Deborah Shaffer, Solidarity Forever: An Oral History of the IWW (Lake View 
Press 1985).  
26 Walter Nelles, Suggestions for Reorganization of the National Civil Liberties Bureau 
(undated), ACLU Papers, reel 16, vol. 120.   
27 Laura M. Weinrib, “The Sex Side of Civil Liberties: United States v. Dennett and the 
Changing Face of Free Speech,” 30 L & Hist Rev 325 (2012). 
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1920s, it was careful to emphasize the neutrality of its principles. And yet, for the 
radical core of the ACLU leadership, civil liberties were synonymous with the 
“right of agitation”—roughly, a right of private actors to marshal persuasion, 
propaganda, and collective power in the arena of political and economic struggle, 
without intervention by the state.  
Needless to say, theirs was not the only view. While conservatives were 
marginal in the 1920s civil liberties coalition, some were sympathetic to 
expanding the scope of private autonomy.28 Progressives, meanwhile, played a 
central part. For many of them, civil liberties served to buttress rather than 
undermine state power. When they endorsed the rights of workers to organize or 
disseminate their views, they emphasized the marketplace of ideas and disavowed 
radical ends. Their defense of labor radicals echoed Justice Holmes’s dissenting 
pronouncement in Gitlow v. New York: “If in the long run the beliefs expressed in 
proletarian dictatorship are destined to be accepted by the dominant forces of the 
community, the only meaning of free speech is that they should be given their 
chance and have their way.”29  
As long as civil liberties were primarily aspirational, disagreements within 
the civil liberties campaign were relatively inconsequential. In the 1930s, by 
contrast, aspiration stood to become reality. As a result, seemingly small 
differences took on immense proportions. And the most important fracture in the 
civil liberties alliance occurred over New Deal labor policy. Put simply, when 
New Dealers argued over the appropriate scope of government involvement in 
securing civil liberties, they were far more concerned about protections for unions 
and collective bargaining than adjustments in the marketplace of ideas. Indeed, 
their attitudes toward the latter were often mere applications of theories they 
developed in the labor context.   
The core of the conflict involved competing attitudes toward state power 
and the federal courts. The various efforts to regulate labor relations during the 
New Deal prescribed a strong role for the state in brokering disputes between 
workers and their employers. This development marked a substantial departure 
from labor’s longstanding skepticism toward state involvement, most familiarly 
expressed in the American Federation of Labor’s commitment to labor 
voluntarism. Although they had often endorsed political candidates and welcomed 
government support in return, AFL unions had vehemently opposed compulsory 
arbitration and favored collective bargaining over statist protections for workers’ 
rights. And while radical trade unionists anticipated the eventuality of a 
proletarian state, in the short term many promoted non-state “direct action.” 
Consistent with American labor leaders’ deep distrust of the state, previous 
measures to protect labor’s rights—most famously, the 1933 Norris-LaGuardia 
                                                
28 See David E. Bernstein, Rehabilitating Lochner: Defending Individual Rights Against 
Progressive Reform (Chicago 2011). Cf. Ken I. Kersch, Constructing Civil Liberties: 
Discontinuities in the Development of American Constitutional Law (Cambridge 2004).   
29 268 US 652 (1925).  
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Act, which the ACLU had helped to draft30—had sought to shield the struggle 
between workers and industry from government (understood to include the courts) 
intervention, not to invite the state in.  Indeed, in the early interwar period, 
insulating the instruments of direct action had been the civil liberties movement’s 
most pressing goal.  
Against this trajectory, the New Deal’s state-centered labor policy reflected 
an ironic reversal of the civil liberty movement’s founding assumptions. New 
Deal legislation explicitly recognized the “right of employees to organize” and 
preserved the “right to strike.” In the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 
Congress eventually declared its intention to protect “the exercise by workers of 
full freedom of association, self organization, and designation of representatives 
of their own choosing.”31 Importantly, it accomplished these objectives not 
merely by preventing state incursions on workers’ organizing efforts, but 
employer interference as well. That is, it marshaled the power of the state to 
facilitate labor activity. In the process, it sharply limited employers’ common law 
prerogatives, including some—such as freedom of contract—that had long been 
accorded constitutional status. 
From the perspective of state involvement, the NLRA reflected a 
compromise.  The statute employed state power to shield workers from employer 
retaliation for concerted activity and to force employers to the bargaining table. 
But it was equally central to the statutory framework that the parties would 
negotiate and police their own substantive contractual terms. The NLRA sought to 
equalize bargaining power by removing legal and economic obstacles to worker 
power. The role of the NLRB was to ensure that employers played by the rules.  
The new approach satisfied most, but not all, proponents of labor’s rights. 
Within the mainstream labor movement, the dissenters were committed 
voluntarists representing established craft unions. Their relatively strong 
bargaining power rendered government assistance unnecessary; in their view, the 
risks of administrative meddling outweighed the benefits.32 By contrast, the 
industrial unionists who sought to organize unskilled workers overwhelmingly 
favored affirmative protections in part because they had more to gain.33  
                                                
30 In 1931, its National Committee on Labor Injunctions managed to produce a draft anti-
injunction measure agreeable to the AFL, labor lawyers, law professors, and interested 
organizations. Monthly Bulletin for Action, January 1931, ACLU Papers, reel 79, vol. 444.  The 
bill eliminated ex parte hearings, ensured that all violations of injunctions would be tried by juries, 
limited punishment of contempt, abolished yellow dog contracts, and ensured that no acts “which 
involve only workers’ rights to meet, speak, [or] circulate literature” would be enjoined. 
Memorandum on the Proposed Injunction Bill, January 1932, ACLU Papers, reel 90, vol. 536.  
Once the federal bill was passed, William Green, president of the AFL, arranged for the ACLU to 
assist in the preparation of state anti-injunction bills, as well. William Green to Roger Baldwin, 29 
December 1933, ACLU Papers, reel 99, vol. 615D. 
31 NLRA Section 13; Section 1.  
32 James Gray Pope, The Thirteenth Amendment Versus the Commerce Clause: Labor and the 
Shaping of American Constitutional Law, 1921-1958, 102 Colum L Rev 1 (2002).  
33 William E. Forbath, Law and the Shaping of the American Labor Movement (Harvard 
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But there were critics on the Left, as well—and the Communists and other 
radicals who opposed the Wagner Act framed their objections as civil liberties 
concerns.34 Influenced by their formulations, the ACLU informed Senators 
Wagner and Walsh in a letter that the organization would not support the Wagner 
Act because no federal agency could be trusted “to fairly determine the issues of 
labor’s rights.” It expressed several concrete objections, including the bill’s 
exclusion of agricultural workers and its failure to prohibit “discrimination on 
account of sex, race, color or political convictions.”35  In later years, these would 
become major civil liberties issues.36  For the time being, however, the ACLU 
emphasized other defects, including the ability of the board to act on its own 
initiative. To ACLU co-founder Roger Baldwin, who authored the letter, any 
governmental intervention in the labor struggle was an independent and 
fundamental incursion on civil liberties.37  
Baldwin considered the contest between labor and capital to be the “central 
struggle involving civil liberties,” and he believed that administrative intervention 
would inevitably undermine labor’s cause. He acknowledged that his continuing 
state skepticism was increasingly out of line with mainstream opinion. Opposition 
to administrative power emanated from two principal sources, he explained: 
“employers still wedded to laissez-faire economics,” and their unlikely allies, 
those “radicals who oppose state capitalism as a form of economic fascism, 
denying to the working class a chance to develop its power.”38 Baldwin was in the 
latter camp, and he believed that government could not be trusted to safeguard 
labor’s interests. The workers who accomplished most were the ones who struck 
                                                                                                                                
1991). 
34 In addition to the concerns described below, Communists worried that exclusive 
representation (coupled with the closed shop) would interfere with organizing efforts by radical 
unions.  
35 Wagner declined to address the objections in light of Baldwin’s “frank statement that [he 
was] philosophically against any legislation that might set up a government agency as one of the 
areas within which the industrial struggle might be waged.” Robert Wagner to Roger Baldwin, 5 
April 1935, ACLU Papers, reel 116, vol. 780.  In general, those advocates of the Wagner Act who 
were concerned with racial discrimination thought that “racial discrimination, etc. will only be 
eliminated after economic injustices are corrected.” John W. Edelman to Roger Baldwin, ACLU 
Papers, reel 116, vol. 780; John P. Davis to Roger Baldwin, 25 January 1935, in Gardner Jackson 
Papers, 1912–1965, Franklin D. Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park, N.Y. (hereafter 
Jackson Papers), General Correspondence, box 3, folder ACLU: Labor (advising against a 
prohibition on racial discrimination in trade unions because “such promises, even if enacted into 
law would be unenforceable in any real sense” and would in any case “be used by the industry as 
another weapon to defeat the solidarity of the trade-union movement,” and urging the ACLU 
instead to enlist the support of the union rank and file in defeating segregation). 
36 See Sophia Lee, The Workplace Constitution from the New Deal to the New Right 
(Cambridge forthcoming 2014). 
37 Roger Baldwin to Robert Wagner, 1 April 1935, ACLU Papers, reel 116, vol. 780; Roger 
Baldwin to David I. Walsh, 30 March 1935, Jackson Papers, General Correspondence, box 3, 
folder ACLU: Labor. 
38 Speech of Roger Baldwin, Annual Meeting of the ACLU, 19 February 1934, ACLU Papers, 
reel 105, vol. 678. 
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hardest. “The real fight is on the job,” he said, “not in Washington.”39 
Where Baldwin saw violence and compulsion, others saw the potential for 
buttressing labor’s strength. Wagner was disappointed at Baldwin’s position and 
considered it short-sighted. In his view, which many progressives shared, 
government regulation was the only feasible means of countering powerful 
private interests. According to Wagner, appropriate state policies would facilitate 
organizing, not quash it.40 As it turned out, the ACLU’s national membership 
sided with Wagner rather than Baldwin, and the organization eventually rescinded 
its opposition to the bill.41  
Historians who have noticed the ACLU’s engagement with New Deal labor 
policy have regarded it as an aberration—a diversion from the organization’s true 
and abiding concerns. In so doing, they have missed or misconstrued the 
organization’s core commitments before and during the New Deal. Civil liberties, 
in 1935, was not reducible to the Bill of Rights.  
What, then, are we to make of the fact that debates over New Deal labor 
legislation were framed around civil liberties? The NLRA created concrete, state-
supported rights of a kind typically absent in accounts of American 
constitutionalism, much less civil liberties. These rights sometimes sounded in 
constitutional language, and they often intersected with claims to freedom of 
speech. Did the Wagner Act’s proponents stake out an alternative constitutional 
vision, or did they reject constitutionalism altogether? Relatedly, what was the 
connection between their substantive commitments and the architecture they 
established for civil liberties enforcement? How did their new sympathy toward 
state solutions to the labor problem translate to more familiar aspects of the civil 
liberties agenda, such as the expressive freedom of political dissenters? 
In discussions over the Wagner Act, advocates for workers’ “civil liberties” 
were up against fundamentals.  For the first time, the progressive project for the 
affirmative protection of labor’s rights was a realistic possibility.  The modern 
                                                
39 Ibid. According to Baldwin, this principle was responsible for the particularly disfavored 
plight of “Negro workers” in the current administrative scheme. “Exploited by the employers in 
the hardest and lowest-paid jobs, they are also excluded from most unions. They cannot organize 
and fight in independent unions, Negro Workers’ rights—N.R.A. or no N.R.A.—are pretty near 
zero.” Ibid. 
40 Robert F. Wagner to Roger Baldwin, 5 April 1935, ACLU Papers, reel 116, vol. 780. 
41 Eg, John W. Edelman, David S. Schick, and Isadore Katz to Roger Baldwin, 3 May 1935, 
ACLU Papers, reel 116, vol. 780; John W. Edelman to Roger Baldwin, ACLU Papers, reel 116, 
vol. 780 (“Trade unionists who know ‘what it’s all about’ realize well enough that the Labor 
Disputes Bill has many weaknesses and will not bring about social justice, but they also know that 
the passage of some such legislation is essential to enable the organization drive in the 
unorganized industries to continue. . . . The Civil Liberties [Union] functions usually for the 
alleged radical unions who are so weak that they are licked before getting started with or without a 
Labor Disputes Bill. In fact the Communist led unions don’t really want to settle strikes and you 
know that is the case. But some of us are connected with really militant-acting unions who do 
things and who want to settle strikes. We have used the government mechanisms and the 
arbitration technique very effectively to that end.”). 
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civil liberties movement had been founded on resistance to state power. When the 
state appeared ready to come genuinely to its aid, much of the labor movement set 
aside its reservations (which, in any case, had always been qualified) and 
embraced government action.   
But for some civil libertarians, resistance to state authority had become a 
core unifying ideology, even outside the labor context. In such cases as Pierce v. 
Society of Sisters, the Scopes trial, and United States v. Dennett, they had 
denounced the governmental oversight of ideas as dangerous and misguided.42 
Over the course of the 1920s, they had expanded from a skeptical stance toward 
state intervention in labor disputes to a general aversion to state interference with 
minority viewpoints, personal morality, and private life.   
The founding leaders of the interwar civil liberties movement were victims 
of their own success. To keep the state out of labor relations, they had hitched the 
right of agitation to the First Amendment. They emphasized a neutral 
commitment to freedom of speech and association consistent with government 
oversight of the economy, rather than a revolutionary right to restructure 
government and the economy through collective power.  Strikes were legitimate 
not because the proletariat retained the right to reconstitute the state, but because 
picketing communicated workers’ views.  
The result was a fundamental reshuffling of the civil liberties lineup. The 
loose coalition of the 1920s was destined to dissolve. In its place, at least four 
competing visions of civil liberties emerged. The first was the radical vision, 
which Baldwin and some labor radicals continued to espouse. On this account, 
which foregrounded the right of agitation, state regulation of labor slid inevitably 
into fascism. To be sure, state suppression of artistic expression and sexual 
freedom was also ill-advised. But the true civil liberties threat was the 
institutionalization and consequent vitiation of labor’s collective, revolutionary 
power.  These radicals did not regard civil liberties as bounded by the Bill of 
Rights. On the contrary, as they often emphasized, civil liberty preexisted the 
Constitution. The right of agitation mapped almost fully onto the labor struggle, 
and it was broad enough to encompass all of workers’ tools. 
The second view was a progressive vision of civil liberties that is still 
familiar to us today. For many New Dealers, the rights to organize, picket, and 
strike were derivative of a constitutional commitment to expressive freedom.  
Theirs was the understanding associated—in distinct but basically compatible 
forms—with Justices Holmes and Brandeis as well as influential First 
Amendment theorists such as Zechariah Chafee and Alexander Meiklejohn. Thus, 
in his capacity as a member of the ACLU’s National Committee, Meiklejohn 
                                                
42 Pierce v Society of Sisters, 268 US 510 (1925) (invalidating an Oregon compulsory public 
education law); Scopes v Tennessee, 152 Tenn 424 (Tenn 1925) (involving academic freedom, 
among other issues); United States v Dennett, 39 F2d 564 (2d Cir 1930) (overturning a criminal 
conviction for distribution of a sex education pamphlet). On these cases, see Weinrib, “The Sex 
Side of Civil Liberties.” 
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wrote to register his support for the NLRA, lamenting “the tendency of the 
[ACLU] Board to engage in industrial disputes instead of fighting for the 
maintaining of civil liberties in connection with them.”43   
The progressives had never entirely accepted the notion of a right of 
agitation as an independent revolutionary force, productive of (rather than 
protected by) the marketplace of ideas.  More to the point, they never were 
opposed to state power as such, merely to the intrusion of the state into the realms 
of democratic decision-making and private conduct. As a result, they were willing 
to bracket labor relations as an appropriate forum for regulation—even if the 
result was ameliorative and counter-revolutionary—as long as rights derived from 
the First Amendment were preserved. In other words, for progressives, 
transformation of the economic system might be accomplished through the 
exercise of civil liberties, but it was not a civil liberty in and of itself.44   
It bears emphasis that the progressive understanding was, as yet, neither 
negative nor necessarily tied to the courts. It was, however, a constitutional 
vision. An earlier generation of progressives had understood civil liberties 
(though they did not yet use that phrase) as a thumb on the scale, not a 
constitutional right. Often, civil liberties served simply as a background condition 
for the exercise of state authority, hardly distinguishable from good policy. 
Wherever possible, they argued, it was advisable to tolerate dissent rather than 
suppress it. Police commissioners, prosecutors, and administrative agencies 
exercised their discretion to accommodate minority interests and unpopular 
views—on occasion, disregarding explicit legislative directives in the process.45  
They did so because they believed that open discussion enhanced democratic 
legitimacy, defused violent conflict by avoiding the production of martyrs, and 
facilitated social and scientific progress. During the interwar period, they 
constitutionalized those commitments, and the progressive vision of civil liberties 
was born.  
Progressives were not sanguine about state power. They acknowledged that 
administrative discretion posed a threat to unpopular minorities and views; postal 
censorship under the wartime Espionage Act and a wide array of invasive state 
practices thereafter had made that reality unavoidable. In their view, however, 
insulating unpopular ideas against state interference served to legitimate rather 
than undermine state power; as an ACLU-commissioned treatise had prematurely 
opined a decade earlier, the courts had abandoned their reliance on “natural 
rights” in favor of  the “modern idea that grants liberty to men . . . for the sake of 
                                                
43 Alexander Meiklejohn to Roger Baldwin, 22 May 1935, ACLU Papers, reel 116, vol. 780. 
44 For some, however, the definition remained capacious. Letter from Arthur Garfield Hays, 7 
May 1935, ACLU Papers, reel 116, vol. 780 (“From the point of view of civil liberties the subject 
of unionism should be confined to the rights of free press, free speech, free assemblage, the right 
to organize, strike, picket and demonstrate, the right to be free from unfair injunctive processes 
and cognate matters.”).   
45 Jeremy Kessler, The Administrative Origins of Modern Civil Liberties Law, 114 Colum L 
Rev 1083 (2014); Rabban, Free Speech in Its Forgotten Years (Cambridge 1997). 
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the state.”46 
Just as they believed that civil liberties might justify government power, the 
progressives believed that government power was a necessary prerequisite for 
civil liberties. Their reasoning is succinctly captured by philosopher and longtime 
ACLU member John Dewey: “social control, especially of economic forces, is 
necessary in order to render secure the liberties of the individual, including civil 
liberties.”47 Even as they called for limits on state power in the domain of 
expressive freedom, they extolled the state’s unique capacity to protect important 
rights. Accordingly, the First Amendment test they endorsed was deferential to 
government efforts to correct market asymmetries, whether economic or 
ideational. Notably, that was a battle they lost in the courts, notwithstanding the 
strong purchase of their views in legal scholarship.  
A third defense of civil liberties would emerge during the 1930s. Rooted in 
a commitment to individual autonomy, the conservative vision regarded the Bill 
of Rights as a bulwark against an intrusive state. Although antecedents of this idea 
appear in nineteenth century treatises and in classical liberal thought, 
conservatives had typically opposed civil liberties claims, distinguishing between 
“liberty and license” and relegating disfavored speech to the latter, unprotected 
category. During the 1920s, the organized bar had opposed ACLU efforts to 
defend radical speech. In the 1930s, however, shifting political winds prompted a 
reevaluation of conservative ideals.  The New Deal posed an unprecedented threat 
to the speech and association of conservative groups. Equally important, a 
vigorous defense of personal rights was poised to counter claims of judicial 
hypocrisy and buttress the case for judicial review.  
Progressives were quick to note the resonances between the radical and 
conservative understandings. The notion that labor relations should be isolated 
from state intervention smacked of the Lochner-era tradition of economic liberty, 
which they had unequivocally repudiated.48  The radicals registered the objection.  
In opposing state labor policy, Roger Baldwin was hesitant “to use so 
misunderstood a word as ‘liberty,’ invoked today so loudly by those rugged 
defenders of property rights” who understood liberty as a “right to exploit the 
American people without governmental interference.”49 He took great pains to 
distinguish the position of the ACLU leadership, emphasizing that “the historic 
conception of liberty” was “the freedom to agitate for social change without 
restraint”50; although both groups opposed the NLRA, their reluctance was 
                                                
46 Leon Whipple, Our Ancient Liberties: The Story of the Origin and Meaning of Civil and 
Religious Liberty in the United States (1927; reprint, New York: De Capo Press, 1972). 
47 John Dewey, “Liberalism and Civil Liberties,” The Social Frontier (February 1936), 137. 
48 Francis Biddle, chair of the NLRB created under Public Resolution No. 44, accused 
Baldwin of sounding like the Liberty League; Francis Biddle to Roger Baldwin, 17 April 1935, 
ACLU Papers, reel 116, vol. 780. 
49 Roger Baldwin, “Civil Liberties under the New Deal,” 24 October 1934, ACLU Papers, 
reel 109, vol. 717. 
50 Ibid. He added: “Practically today that means freedom for the working-class to organize 
and of minorities to conduct their propaganda.”   
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justified on “diametrically opposite grounds.” 51 The radical concern was “human 
rights,” which were expressed collectively rather than as individual rights.52 Like 
the radicals, conservatives linked civil liberties to labor relations, but in place of 
the radicals’ abolition of wage labor or the progressives’ social welfare, they 
privileged individual autonomy of the Lochner-era ilk, including the freedom to 
sell one’s labor under conditions that progressives and radicals deemed coercive. 
Although this Article focuses on the left-liberal constituents of the civil liberties 
coalition, the conservative foil played a powerful background role during this 
period, and it is important to bear it in mind.  
  Finally, debates over the Wagner Act hinted at a fourth conception of 
civil liberties that would take root within the NLRB and its congressional 
counterpart over the coming years. Like the radical understanding, the labor 
interventionist vision evinced unabashed support for labor’s cause. Unlike the 
radicals, however, proponents of the interventionist view—like the progressives—
imagined a strong role for the state in enforcing civil liberties.53 Their aspirations 
for the administrative enforcement of civil liberties were intimately bound up with 
their antagonistic relationship to the judicial construction of constitutional rights. 
Importantly, the civil liberties they defended encompassed not only the rights to 
picket, boycott, and strike, but also a stronger position at the bargaining table. 
They believed affirmative state support for labor organizing would best serve the 
end goals of labor activity, including higher wages and better working conditions. 
Indeed, To NLRB chair J. Warren Madden, it was the state’s role to enforce as 
“fundamental” the liberty of the workers “to emerge from a condition of 
economic helplessness, and dependence upon the will of another, to a status of 
having one’s chosen representative received as an equal at the bargaining 
                                                
51 Roger Baldwin to Robert Wagner, 1 April 1935, ACLU Papers, reel 116, vol. 780. See also 
Joseph Schlossberg to Roger Baldwin, 14 May 1935, ACLU Papers, reel 116, vol. 780 (“Rightly 
or wrongly the American Federation of Labor is committed to the Wagner Bill. By your 
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52 Baldwin, “The Main Issues of Civil Liberties under the New Deal,” 8 December 1934, 
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unions are at a tremendous disadvantage in a bare handed economic struggle.” David J. Saposs, 
The American Labor Movement Since the War, Quarterly Journal of Economics 49 (1935), 239.  
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conference table.”54  This liberty was prior to all other rights—including the rights 
of speech, press, and assembly—which might benefit the workers only after their 
right of collective bargaining was realized.55  
 These categories are, of course, ideal types. They are meant to capture, in 
broad strokes, diverse understandings of the conditions for human thriving and 
their underlying values. Those values, in turn, are linked to divergent accounts of 
the proper scope of state power and private rights. Many of the figures discussed 
in this Article flitted between these commitments, drawing on strains of each in 
service of legal and political goals.  Few would have drawn the lines between 
them so starkly.  
 Indeed, the permeability of the boundaries rendered the categories 
unstable and susceptible to revision. In the late 1930s, these competing accounts 
of civil liberties would attain a rough equilibrium. A fifth, liberal vision of civil 
liberties embraced a broad spectrum of the earlier views but, in finding common 
ground, fundamentally transformed them.  
 
II. Civil Liberties in the New Deal State 
In other work, I explore the process through which ideological convergence 
on a state-skeptical and judicially enforceable First Amendment emerged during 
the interwar period and culminated in the New Deal settlement commonly 
associated with Carolene Products’ Footnote Four.56 The goal for this project is a 
different one. In the remainder of this Article, I examine how the various 
understandings of civil liberties manifested and differed within the institutions 
designated for their enforcement in the years before the new constitutional 
framework crystallized. In elucidating these ideas, I refer to specific concepts, 
such as free speech or the right to organize, where feasible. Where I use the more 
general term, either I intend to draw attention to its fluidity, or I link it to one of 
the four visions described above in Part II. In the latter case, I mean it to 
encompass the bundle of rights and policy preferences that adherents of a 
particular vision ascribed to it. 
What follows are suggestive snapshots of the four principal New Deal 
institutions in which ideological contestation over civil liberties took place. They 
are not comprehensive histories of these institutions or of the mundane 
administration of rights claims within their respective domains.  Rather, they 
focus on discrete examples of consensus and conflict. In order to make this 
project feasible within a single Article and, more importantly, because of its 
central significance to the actors who articulated the contours of civil liberties 
                                                
54 Radio address by Warren Madden, 29 January 1939, quoted in Respondents’ Sixth Circuit 
Brief, Ford v. NLRB, 54.  
55 Ibid.  
56 United States v. Carolene Products Company, 304 US 144, 152 n 4 (1938). Footnote 4, 
which provided the basis for the most familiar civil-rights victories of the twentieth century, was 
initially invoked far more frequently in First Amendment cases than in race cases.  
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during the New Deal, the discussion focuses on the labor question. The hope is 
that observing the tangible legal and political consequences of contestation, while 
holding the underlying ideological objectives relatively constant, will yield insight 
into the relationship between government institutions and the rights they are 
designated to protect.  
 
The Judicial Enforcement of Civil Liberties 
Strong judicial enforcement of the Bill of Rights is properly regarded as a 
keystone of the New Deal settlement. The transformation in constitutional law 
during the late 1930s is conventionally understood to contain two distinct but 
interconnected parts: first, a relaxation of structural constraints on Congress’s 
control over the economy, entailing the complete revision of commerce clause 
and federalism doctrine, in addition to the abrogation of freedom of contract and 
property rights; and second, an invigoration of constitutional protections for 
“discrete and insular minorities” along with free speech.57 The latter is said to 
ensure the democratic legitimacy of the former. That is, judicial deference to the 
outcomes of democratic processes requires robust debate, with ample protection 
for minority interests, as state policy is formulated and enforced.58  
However sensible the new arrangement appears in hindsight, however, few 
contemporaries understood judicial review as susceptible to decoupling in this 
way. On the contrary, most critics, as well as conservative opponents of the 
Court-packing plan, assumed that judicial review came as a package, and that in 
the absence of constitutional amendment, expansion of the First and Fourteenth 
Amendments to protect expressive freedom would buttress the Court’s economic 
due process doctrine as well. That was a trade-off few were willing to make. 
Accordingly, many New Dealers were willing to forgo judicial enforcement of the 
Bill of Rights, and some actively resisted it.  They insisted that the stewardship of 
personal liberties belonged in the political branches. Any other path, they 
assumed, would facilitate the judicial dismantling of the New Deal economic 
program.  
As events unfolded, the judiciary’s anti-regulatory constitutionalism evolved 
along less predictable lines. The Supreme Court definitively abandoned its 
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aggressive defense of property and economic liberty. And yet, industry rapidly 
assimilated free speech as a second-best alternative to Lochner-era economic 
rights. By 1940, the First Amendment would stand in for substantive due process 
as a shield against government regulation of industry, a process I explore 
elsewhere. Labor’s rights to picket and boycott would largely be written out of the 
First Amendment, even while the rights of corporations to circularize their 
employees and to influence political elections were written in.59  
In 1937, however, the disaggregation of personal and property rights still 
harbored radical potential—and an account of civil liberties that is true to 
historical circumstances has to evaluate civil liberties claims as they were framed, 
not as they have been remembered. Such an approach necessitates a reassessment 
of the line between the two halves of the New Deal settlement. In the late 1930s, 
the Court’s vigorous enforcement of “preferred freedoms” and its newfound 
deference toward labor and economic legislation were of a single civil liberties 
piece. Both advanced that crucial segment where the various civil liberties visions 
intersected: the protection of workers’ rights to organize, bargain collectively, and 
strike.  
Of the many institutions that construed and enforced civil liberties during 
the New Deal, the Supreme Court is undoubtedly the most familiar. Constitutional 
law scholars have painstakingly traced the Court’s evolving understanding of 
expressive freedom between the World Wars: its flagrant dismissal of the Holmes 
and Brandeis dissents; its tepid incorporation of the First Amendment into the 
Fourteenth beginning with Gitlow v. New York; its rejection of prior restraint in 
Near v. Minnesota; its bold extension of First Amendment protection to freedom 
of assembly and religious proselytizing in DeJonge v. Oregon and Lovell v. City 
of Griffin.60  
 Sometimes, accounts of the Supreme Court’s early First Amendment 
jurisprudence observe that the interwar cases disproportionately involved labor 
speech. They assume, however, that the Court’s inquiry pertained only to the 
freedom of radicals and revolutionaries to disseminate their subversive views. In 
short, the constitutional law canon has fallen victim to winners’ history. That is, it 
has been distorted by the near total dominance in the postwar era of a liberal 
vision of civil liberties premised on judicially enforceable constitutional rights. 
Given the wide circulation and high salience of alternative understandings of civil 
liberties during the New Deal, it is unsurprising that the liberal conception was 
not the only one to reach the Supreme Court.  
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Consequently, this section starts not with the well-worn First Amendment 
cases, but rather their Commerce Clause and freedom of contract counterparts. 
Two features of the “Constitutional Revolution” are often elided in discussion of 
the best known cases. First, insofar as the Wagner Act advanced the rights of 
labor, Jones and Laughlin Steel was not a complement to the Supreme Court’s 
civil liberties decisions; it was itself a civil liberties decision.61 To be sure, the 
Supreme Court upheld the NLRA as a valid exercise of the Commerce Clause, not 
a constitutional mandate. In other words, it did not justify the statute as a 
legitimate means of enforcing the underlying constitutional rights of employees to 
organize, whether under the Thirteenth Amendment (an argument advanced by 
Andrew Furuseth and other conservative trade unionists) or the First.62 It does not 
follow, however, that the justices were blind to the labor interventionist vision of 
civil liberties that motivated the NLRB. Given how dominant that understanding 
was in public rhetoric and political debate, it would have been hard to miss.63  
Historical work suggests that the NLRB was reluctant to frame its legal 
claims in terms of constitutional rights for fear that the Court would cabin them.64 
Rightly or wrongly, the courts were understood to hold an interpretive monopoly 
in the domain of constitutional rights, and labor advocates were all too aware of 
their past biases. New Deal lawmakers believed the Wagner Act vindicated 
substantive rights—even constitutional rights—and they loudly proclaimed as 
much outside the courtroom.65 Their legal arguments, however, emphasized 
neutral principles and congressional prerogatives, in a poignant parallel to the 
debates over free speech. In light of this strategic approach, it is striking that the 
labor interventionist vision of civil liberties found its way into the majority 
opinion in Jones and Laughlin Steel, even if the Court did not rely on it.66 
Notwithstanding the NLRB’s cautious approach, Hughes described “the right of 
employees to self-organization” as a “fundamental right.”67 
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 Of course, the NLRA was designed to eliminate employer interference 
with labor organizing. It was not directed at state suppression of the right to picket 
or strike, and justifying it on First Amendment grounds would have required a 
revolutionary conception of state action and the scope of the Bill of Rights.68 Such 
an approach was not unthinkable, but New Deal officials and NLRB brief-writers 
had good reason to doubt it would succeed. In other contexts, however, the federal 
courts had ample opportunity to evaluate labor activity in constitutional terms.  In 
cases involving interference with strikes and pickets by state or local officials, 
sometimes as a direct result of state legislation or city ordinances, they faced the 
question whether labor activity was constitutionally protected head on.  
Thus, the second important corrective to the conventional account of the 
Constitutional Revolution stems from the observation that labor cases and First 
Amendment cases often overlapped in unfamiliar ways.  For example, Justice 
Brandeis’s 1937 decision in Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union is well known 
by labor scholars for upholding a state statute authorizing labor picketing and 
withholding injunctive relief.  The ACLU filed an amicus brief in the case, but it 
nowhere mentioned the First Amendment, instead invoking the “right to 
organize” to buttress the legitimacy of the labor bill it had helped to secure.69 
Notwithstanding the organization’s framing of the issues, Justice Brandeis’s 
opinion presumed that “members of a union might … make known the facts of a 
                                                                                                                                
employees to self-organization and to select representatives of their own choosing for collective 
bargaining or other mutual protection without restraint or coercion by their employer. That is a 
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unable to leave the employ and resist arbitrary and unfair treatment; that union was essential to 
give laborers opportunity to deal on an equality with their employer. We reiterated these views 
when we had under consideration the Railway Labor Act of 1926. Fully recognizing the legality of 
collective action on the part of employees in order to safeguard their proper interests, we said that 
Congress was not required to ignore this right, but could safeguard it. Congress could seek to 
make appropriate collective action of employees an instrument of peace, rather than of strife. We 
said that such collective action would be a mockery if representation were made futile by 
interference with freedom of choice. Hence, the prohibition by Congress of interference with the 
selection of representatives for the purpose of negotiation and conference between employers and 
employees, ‘instead of being an invasion of the constitutional right of either, was based on the 
recognition of the rights of both.’” 
68 For this reason, the Thirteenth Amendment appeared to some contemporaries to be a 
stronger alternative. Pope, “Thirteenth Amendment.” 
69 Senn v. Tile Layers Protection Union, Brief on Behalf of the ACLU and International 
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labor dispute, for freedom of speech is guaranteed by the Federal Constitution.”70 
Indeed, the foundational labor and speech cases often involved the same 
parties, the same lawyers, and the same underlying activity. Take Associated 
Press v. NLRB, decided the same day as Jones and Laughlin Steel.71  In a world 
divided between newly deferential economic review and preferred personal 
freedoms, the case falls squarely on the labor side of the line. After all, it was 
among the five foundational cases upholding the constitutionality of the Wagner 
Act. The Supreme Court concluded that the Associated Press was involved in 
interstate commerce and therefore validly within the reach of the statute. In a 
surprising twist, the AP had also asserted a First Amendment claim premised on 
the conservative civil liberties vision (“Freedom of expression,” it concluded, “is 
as precious as either due process or the equal protection of law”). Citing recent 
First Amendment victories for radical defendants, among other cases,72 it argued 
that the compulsory employment of unionized workers would undermine its 
control of editorial content. “Freedom of the press and freedom of speech, as 
guaranteed by the First Amendment, means more than freedom from censorship 
by government,” the AP’s brief argued, albeit unsuccessfully.73 “[I]t means that 
freedom of expression must be jealously protected from any form of 
governmental control or influence.” 
In another context, those words might have been warmly endorsed by the 
ACLU—but in Associated Press v. NLRB, they encountered fierce resistance. 
Indeed, the attorney for the American Newspaper Guild was none other than 
ACLU co-counsel Morris Ernst. In an amicus brief for the Guild, he squarely 
rejected the AP’s reasoning. The First Amendment, he argued, did not license the 
press to discriminate against unionized employees. On the contrary, non-
enforcement of editors’ organizing rights posed the graver threat to the First 
Amendment. “Non-action of a governmental agency may be far more destructive 
of a fundamental guarantee than positive legislation,” Ernst explained. That 
Congress could not abridge the freedom of the press did not preclude it from 
combating “an evil which threatens of itself to nullify that freedom.” Labor unrest 
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was an impediment to the free flow of information and liberty of thought; the key 
to a free press was a strong union.74  
Notably, Ernst also served as counsel in a seminal First Amendment case, 
Hague v. CIO.  The case stemmed from the suppression of CIO organizing 
activities in Jersey City, across the Hudson River from New York. By the time it 
was decided, the Supreme Court’s hands-off approach to economic legislation 
was firmly entrenched, and the NLRA was secure against judicial invalidation. 
The trouble in Jersey City was not recalcitrant employers, though they played a 
role. Rather, the principal obstacle to organizing in Jersey City was the town’s 
powerful mayor, Frank Hague.  
Boss Hague, as he was known to his political foes, was determined to keep 
the CIO out of Jersey City. Facing a fiscal crisis owing as much to 
mismanagement as the Great Depression, he had launched a campaign to attract 
New York businesses to Jersey City by keeping unions at bay. Hague’s police 
force harassed, beat, and arrested agitators and shut down all picketing, meetings, 
and leafleting by organized labor—and by the ACLU observers who endeavored 
to defend them. When organizers began provoking arrests in order to challenge 
local ordinances and police practices in the courts, Hague simply had them 
deported across city lines. 
Hague, then, involved civil liberties violations in recognizable guise. As 
Jersey City officials, Hague and his henchmen were unmistakable state actors, 
and the Supreme Court had clearly indicated that they were within First 
Amendment reach. In a 1939 decision, the Court upheld the CIO’s right to picket 
and hold meeting in Jersey City’s public spaces, subject to reasonable limitations 
to maintain order in the public interest. In this, they implicitly validated the lower 
courts’ implementation of the progressive civil liberties vision. The Court of 
Appeals had insisted that the city was obligated to open space for public 
discussion, and if private violence threatened, it was the function of the police to 
“preserve order while they speak.”75 Mere non-interference would not suffice.  
The various opinions in Hague (none commanded a majority) turned on a 
highly technical jurisdictional issue. It is notable, however, that Justice Roberts’s 
opinion, which uncharacteristically rested on the Privileges and Immunities 
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, deemed the CIO’s activity in Jersey City 
protected because the rights of national citizenship encompassed discussion of the 
NLRA.  
In the face of international totalitarianism, the ACLU secured broad-based 
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support for its legal and publicity campaigns in Hague. It even managed to solicit 
an amicus brief from the American Bar Association’s newly formed Committee 
on the Bill of Rights—a development that marked the ascent of the conservative 
vision of civil liberties in the wake of the Court-packing plan. The wide consensus 
gratified the ACLU, but the CIO leadership was more ambivalent. On the one 
hand, the Hague decision was an unmistakable “go signal” (as California’s state 
bar journal put it) for labor organizing in Jersey City and elsewhere.76  On the 
other, public enthusiasm for free speech was supplanting support for labor activity 
per se. The Yale Law Journal reflected that “when practically every shade of 
public opinion became outraged at what appeared to be a blatant denial of 
fundamental rights, emphasis shifted from specific attempts by one group at 
raising abnormally low Jersey City working conditions to the more basic issue of 
whether constitutional guaranties of free speech, free press, and free assembly 
apply to union sympathizers as well as to other citizens.” In other words, civil 
liberties claims were shifting markedly away from labor interventionist demands. 
The transition took some time. As late as 1940, the Supreme Court handed 
down two monumental decisions on labor and free speech that also advanced 
labor interventionist goals. In Thornhill v. Alabama, the Court (invoking footnote 
four of Carolene Products) upheld the right to picket as an expression of ideas.77  
The decision established that “the dissemination of information concerning the 
facts of a labor dispute” was within the realm of “free discussion” protected by 
the Constitution.78 As in Senn v. Tile Layers Protection Union, the Court stressed 
the public communicative function of picketing. Even if its effect was to induce 
action in others, picketing was speech.79 The court observed: “Free discussion 
concerning the conditions in industry and the causes of labor disputes appears to 
us indispensable to the effective and intelligent use of the processes of popular 
government to shape the destiny of modern industrial society.” In Thornhill’s 
lesser known companion case, Carlson v. California, the Court declared that 
“publicizing the facts of a labor dispute in a peaceful way” were likewise entitled 
to constitutional protection against abridgement by a state.80 Here was the 
vindication of longstanding radical and labor interventionist goals, cloaked in the 
language of expressive freedom.  
Thornhill and Carlson were argued in the Supreme Court by, respectively, 
Joseph Padway, AFL general counsel and a member of the ABA’s Committee on 
the Bill of Rights, and Lee Pressman, CIO general counsel.81 Padway, who had 
argued Senn, had good reason to be optimistic about vindicating labor’s rights in 
the judiciary. Pressman had long expressed skepticism toward the courts, but he 
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had come to believe that the First Amendment might offer a counterbalance to its 
protection of property rights. In his brief, he cited Hague for the proposition that 
“danger to the state arises not from the picket line but from the vigilantes who 
would suppress the picket line by force and violence.”82 Despite his general 
antipathy toward a “legal approach to labor action,” he saw great potential in “the 
growing realization and acceptance of the fact that labor action is nothing more or 
less than the exercise of constitutional rights” to freedom of speech and 
assembly.83 
The constitutional status of labor’s most effective methods—including mass 
picketing and the secondary boycott—was, however, far from secure.84 A rapid 
contraction of First Amendment protection for labor activity followed on 
Thornhill and Carlson’s heels.  In its 1941 decision in Milk Wagon Drivers Union 
v. Meadowmoor Dairies, the Supreme Court upheld a state-court injunction 
against picketing by a union that had engaged in violence and destruction of 
property, explaining that “utterance in a contest of violence can lose its 
significance as an appeal to reason and become part of an instrument of force.”85 
Under such circumstances even peaceful expression could be constitutionally 
curtailed, Justice Frankfurter explained for the Court. To the extent that labor 
doubted that judicial review would reliably serve its interests, its fears were well 
founded. Indeed, from the perspective of the ACLU’s foundational goals, the 
modern First Amendment turned out to be an abject failure. Radical propaganda 
retained its protected status, but the right to organize quickly fell out of the realm 
of ideas.  
 
The Congressional Enforcement of Civil Liberties  
In the years between passage of the Wagner Act and its validation by the 
Supreme Court in Jones and Laughlin Steel, employers flagrantly resisted 
compliance with the new legislation. Indeed, they continued to engage in blatant 
anti-labor practices, including industrial espionage, strikebreaking, and the use of 
munitions and private police forces.86 Although these methods were clear 
violations of workers’ new statutory rights, employers’ lawyers advised that the 
Wagner Act was unconstitutional and would shortly be declared so by the 
Supreme Court.  True to form, employers mobilized around a legal campaign, 
supported most visibly by the American Liberty League’s National Lawyers 
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Committee, a collection of corporate lawyers who believed that the Wagner Act 
was incompatible with Lochner-era values. The threat of an adverse decision was 
so menacing that the NLRB devoted much of its energy during 1935 and 1936 to 
formulating its own legal strategy.   
Congress did not leave the beleaguered NLRB without recourse.  In the 
spring of 1936—prompted by the suppression of the Southern Tenant Farmers 
Union, an organization of tenant farmers and sharecroppers in northeastern 
Arkansas, and by the ineffectuality of the NLRB—Senator Robert La Follette, Jr. 
(whose famous father had begun his career as a law partner of the Free Speech 
League’s Gilbert Roe), submitted a Senate resolution authorizing the investigation 
of “violations of the rights of free speech and assembly and undue interference 
with the right of labor to organize and bargain collectively.”87  La Follette initially 
doubted that the Senate would act on his proposal, but after effective preliminary 
hearings, the resolution was approved in June with significant public support.88  
He went on to chair the subcommittee, which was organized within the Senate’s 
Committee on Education and Labor.89 
Known as the La Follette Civil Liberties Committee, the new body was an 
early and powerful voice for the labor interventionist vision of civil liberties. As 
its title suggests, the committee regarded the rights of labor, whether statutory or 
constitutional, as core civil liberties issues.  It set out to investigate the activities 
of detective agencies, employer associations, corporations, and individual 
employers “in so far as these activities result in interference with the rights of 
labor such as the formation of outside unions, collective bargaining, rights of 
assemblage and other liberties guaranteed by the Constitution.”90 No one bothered 
to explain how employers, as private actors, might infringe upon constitutional 
rights.  
Prominent members of the ACLU were instrumental in engineering the new 
measure, which they had first proposed at the Conference on Civil Liberties under 
the New Deal. Roger Baldwin, newly reconciled to state involvement in labor 
relations,91 was convinced that “the worst evil which should be investigated is the 
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mounting rise of force and violence by employers against the organization of 
labor,” which threatened “rights presumably guaranteed by federal legislation.”92 
He thought a successful inquiry would justify a full slate of federal legislation 
protecting the rights of labor against public and private curtailment.93 At first, the 
ACLU urged the committee to investigate government abuses in other contexts as 
well.94  It soon became evident, however, that the La Follette Committee would 
confine its inquiry to labor relations. At the preliminary hearings, NLRB chair J. 
Warren Madden was the first witness.  He tellingly declared, “The right of 
workmen to organize themselves into unions has become an important civil 
liberty.”95 The connection between the two bodies was not merely ideological; 
much of the La Follette Committee’s staff was borrowed from the NLRB.  
The La Follette Committee aimed to eliminate all interference with workers’ 
right to organize, whether perpetrated by local law enforcement or by employers 
themselves.  Its engineers, however, were seasoned and savvy politicians. They 
sought to generate support by invoking the specter of totalitarianism—“We are 
unquestionably the most powerful agency against Fascism in this country,” one 
staff member wrote—and the corresponding collapse of American democracy.96  
In his testimony at the hearings, NLRB member Edwin Smith recited the civil 
liberties movement’s well-worn argument that unchecked abuses would lead to 
violent revolt.  He denounced “entrenched interests” and “alleged patriotic 
organizations” for arguing that repression was the only means of saving America 
from the radicals.  “You cannot suppress freedom of expression,” he cautioned, 
“without rapidly undermining democracy itself.”97  
La Follette and his staff were policymakers, not scholars or theorists. There 
was much slippage in their characterization of civil liberties. Still, some salient 
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features emerge from their public defenses of the committee and from their 
private communications. First, the true goal of the committee was something 
more than expressive freedom or individual rights. As Edwin Smith put it, “civil 
liberties are not abstractions which hover above the passions of contending groups 
and can be successfully brought to earth to promote the general welfare.”98 Robert 
La Follette was adamant that “the right of workers to speak freely and assemble 
peacefully is immediate and practical, a right which translates itself into the 
concrete terms of job security, fair wages and decent living conditions.”99 
Progressives and conservatives increasingly were casting civil liberties in neutral 
terms—as a commitment to deliberative openness rather than particular values.  
The La Follette Committee, by contrast, was most focused on economic security.  
Second, and relatedly, threats to civil liberties did not emanate exclusively, 
or even primarily, from the state. The Committee was determined to introduce 
new, affirmative protections for labor’s organizing efforts, many of which were 
directed against private action. These rights would be established by statute and 
enforceable through administrative actors—namely, the NLRB—as well as the 
state and federal courts.  
The La Follette Committee did not clarify the relationship between its 
operations and the Constitution. In common usage, civil liberties were 
increasingly associated with the Bill of Rights, and defenses of the committee’s 
work often capitalized on the cachet of the American constitutional tradition. 
Certainly the La Follette Committee considered its recommendations to be 
consistent with the Constitution, even important extensions of its underlying 
goals. To justify incursions on employers’ property rights and managerial 
discretion as constitutional mandates, however, would require a revision of 
constitutional thought more radical than the so-called Constitutional Revolution.  
A changing political climate made any such claim untenable before it could 
be tested. In spring 1937, the same season in which the Supreme Court upheld the 
constitutionality of the NLRA, the tide began to turn against labor’s demands for 
state support. Following a major CIO organizing effort involving a wave of 
powerful sit-down strikes, employers’ groups organized to mobilize public 
opinion against worker lawlessness and to pressure local police and administrators 
to enforce the law. Some specifically invoked the language of “civil rights.”100 
Increasingly, public and political figures expressed concern at unions’ aggressive 
attitude, and momentum seeped from the congressional labor agenda.  The 
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economy had contracted sharply as a result of Roosevelt’s fiscal policy, fueling 
frustration and desperation by industry and workers alike.101  
The Wagner Act, newly secured by the Supreme Court from constitutional 
attack, was suddenly open to legislative challenge.  Republican opponents of the 
New Deal reached out to Southern Democrats, who feared that active intervention 
in labor disputes would open the door to federal interference with Jim Crow.  To 
make matters worse, the AFL attacked the NLRB for favoring the CIO and 
undermining labor voluntarism.  New Deal Democrats responded by citing the 
violent and unlawful suppression of labor by employers, relying heavily on the 
findings of the La Follette Civil Liberties Committee.  
By the summer of 1938, however, neither Congress nor the public 
considered the Committee to be a credible source. The staff was regularly fielding 
demands that it investigate labor unions in addition to employers.  One outraged 
citizen, voicing widely shared anti-union sentiments, insisted that “people read the 
News Papers and know that if strikers did not attack men hired to protect plants, 
there would be no fighting.”102  Another, who claimed to have known the elder 
Senator La Follette as well as Samuel Gompers, lamented the nation’s decline 
into “anarchy” and urged the Committee to present a “true picture of all sides.”103  
In a move that captures the growing incompatibility between the labor 
interventionist vision of civil liberties and its alternatives, one correspondent 
suggested that the committee investigate President Roosevelt for his court-
packing plan.104  
In March 1939, the work of the La Follette Civil Liberties Committee drew 
to a close. Its extensive findings over years of congressional hearings culminated 
in a bill “to eliminate certain oppressive labor practices affecting interstate and 
foreign commerce.”  Had it passed, it would have made anti-labor espionage, 
munitions, private police, and strikebreaking punishable by fine or imprisonment.  
William Green and John L. Lewis both supported the bill.105  So, “heartily,” did 
Attorney General Murphy, who believed “that the Federal Government has a 
definite role to play in the preservation of civil liberties.”106 By 1939, however, a 
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sweeping congressional endorsement of the labor interventionist vision of civil 
liberties was bound to fail. Instead, the La Follette Committee yielded the 
spotlight to Martin Dies, Jr.’s House Committee on Un-American Activity. 
Among the many insinuations made by that Committee was that the La Follette 
Committee’s civil liberties work was corrupted by Communist influence.107  
 
The Administrative Enforcement of Civil Liberties 
Consistent with the La Follette Committee’s labor interventionist vision of 
civil liberties, the early NLRB considered the rights of labor to be independent 
rights deserving of state protection. NLRB member Edwin Smith put the point 
bluntly. In his view, organized labor was the only force capable of preserving 
democracy. To survive, he insisted, it must “receive from the government firm 
protection against those who have the power and will to destroy it.”108  
In its enforcement of the Wagner Act, the NLRB sought to implement this 
ideal. The early operations of the NLRB have been documented in tremendous 
depth and detail. On the whole, its members were unexpectedly aggressive in 
advancing labor’s interests. Whether state support energized organized labor or 
instead de-radicalized it is a much debated question. So too is the effect of the 
NLRB’s preference for CIO-style industrial unionism over the established craft 
model of the AFL. These questions have important implications with respect to 
the effects of institutional differences on civil liberties enforcement, and I will 
briefly address them in Part III. For now, I want to stress that the NLRB often 
spoke in terms of civil liberties when it enforced the NLRA.  
For much of the 1930s, civil liberties advocates within and outside the 
NLRB assumed they were defending the same ideals. Labor interventionists at the 
NLRB proclaimed their commitment to protecting the civil liberties of workers. 
Proponents of the progressive civil liberties vision celebrated the agency’s service 
on behalf of labor but regarded its operations as economic regulation outside the 
sweep of civil liberties concerns. In early 1939, however, the two visions clashed 
head on. Building on mounting hostility toward CIO organizing tactics and 
perceived partisanship of the NLRB, a congressional coalition of Republicans and 
Southern Democrats introduced a host of amendments designed to curb the 
Board’s authority. Concurrently, Massachusetts Democrat David I. Walsh 
proposed a more moderate bill, which was backed by the AFL and commanded 
considerable support.  
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Two provisions in the Walsh bill were particularly divisive among civil 
liberties advocates. The first provided for more robust judicial review of NLRB 
decisions. Although progressive civil libertarians opposed the measure because it 
singled out the NLRB for special treatment, they were beginning to regard 
administrative agencies as incipient civil liberties threats. In other words, the 
progressive civil liberties vision was in transition. One of its longstanding 
pillars—confidence in unfettered administrative regulation of economic relations, 
if not free speech—had begun to crumble. In response to the bill, ACLU attorney 
Arthur Garfield Hays called for enhanced procedural protections in “trial by 
commission” and convened a committee to study quasi-judicial boards.109 Hays 
thought the commissions were censoring business, “which [was] just as bad as a 
censorship over literature.”  
Another of Senator Walsh’s suggestions was even more pressing: a 
provision guaranteeing an employer’s right to free speech in the context of union 
organizing efforts. During the late 1930s, the NLRB had aggressively policed the 
employer distribution of anti-union materials on the theory that it coerced 
employees in the exercise of their right to organize under the NLRA. In response, 
the ACLU reluctantly defended the right of such notorious anti-labor employers 
as Henry Ford to circulate anti-union propaganda—a position that polarized the 
ACLU and coincided with the expulsion or resignation of its board’s Communists 
and fellow travelers.110   
Testimony by J. Warren Madden before the Senate Committee on Education 
and Labor captures the NLRB’s understanding. Madden told the committee that 
an employer’s accurate statement that the leaders of a union were Communists 
might dissuade an employee from joining and would therefore constitute 
coercion. “The fact that it is true,” he insisted, “does not keep it from being 
coercive.” Citing labor injunctions, he argued that “there is no privilege against 
being enjoined from telling the truth if you state it at such times or under such 
circumstances that you destroy somebody else’s rights.”111 Madden was weighing 
employers’ speech rights against the rights of workers to organize. Both were 
arguably grounded in the Constitution. For Madden, that the suppression of 
workers’ rights stemmed from private coercion rather than state action was not 
dispositive. Building on the Realist insight that rights claims involve trade-offs, 
he argued that the state was best positioned to make the necessary calculations 
and intervene on behalf of the weaker party.  If free speech was incompatible with 
economic justice, the former would have to give way.  
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From the progressive perspective, “Brother Madden[’s]” reasoning 
threatened to undercut a decade of civil liberties gains.112  Indeed, labor activity 
had often been regulated for precisely the reasons Madden was endorsing; the 
Supreme Court had long denied First Amendment protection to labor picketing in 
light of its coercive effect. Despite “violent[] oppos[ition]” to the free speech 
amendment from longtime labor allies,113 many progressives thought some sort of 
legislative reformulation was desirable.114 The ACLU ultimately opposed the free 
speech amendment, along with the other amendments, as “either unnecessary or 
dangerous to the fundamental purpose of the act.”115  The organization did not, 
however, endorse the NLRB’s view of employer speech. Instead, it argued that 
existing limitations on the Board’s authority were sufficient—that the 
abridgement of employer speech was inconsistent with the NLRA as well as 
unconstitutional.116  
In this, the progressive and conservative visions of civil liberties aligned. 
The demise of economic due process had made civil liberties all the more 
appealing: the dispute over employer speech demonstrated that the First 
Amendment might succeed where freedom of contract had failed. The ACLU’s 
position on employer speech was warmly celebrated by the United States 
Chamber of Commerce and the ABA.  
 
The Executive Enforcement of Civil Liberties 
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 Enforcement of constitutional rights through the courts is often reduced to 
the practice of judicial review. During the New Deal, however, a strategy 
emerged for advancing those rights through litigation—one that entailed 
vindicating rather than invalidating government interests. Over the course of the 
1930, the state began to pursue civil liberties enforcement through its 
prosecutorial arm, by bringing transgressors to justice in the federal courts. 
On January 3, 1939, Frank Murphy succeeded Homer Cummings as 
Attorney General of the United States. As mayor of Detroit from 1930 to 1933, 
Murphy had been a strong advocate for the unemployed. In 1937, he was elected 
governor of Michigan. Shortly after he took office, he refused to call in state 
troops to break a sit-down strike by the fledgling UAW. That decision was 
influential in the subsequent rise of the CIO.  As Murphy explained the affair, 
workers in Michigan had been angry at the failure of employers to abide by the 
Wagner Act, as well as the prevalent use of industrial espionage to defeat 
unionization.  In seizing control of industrial property, thousands of misguided 
but “honest citizens” had acted to “defend[] their own rights against what they 
believed to be the lawless refusal of their employers to recognize their unions.” 
Murphy emphasized that he had never condoned sit-down strikes, and he had 
advised union representatives that they were illegal and imprudent. He 
nonetheless believed that in the face of widespread disobedience, it was necessary 
to “weed out the cause,” not merely to “enforce the law.”117 
 Murphy brought the same sensibilities to his duties as Attorney General. 
He was intimately familiar with the work of the La Follette Committee in his 
home state and elsewhere, and he was convinced that the abridgement of workers’ 
“civil liberties” by employers and their government collaborators was a major 
source of class strife.  But Murphy’s commitment was not limited to workers’ 
rights. He considered civil liberties to be essential to every part of life, “social, 
political, and economic.” They extended to such far-ranging ideals as “the right of 
self-government, the right of every man to speak his thoughts freely, the 
opportunity to express his individual nature in his daily life and work, [and] the 
privilege of believing in the religion that his own conscience tells him is right.”  
The American model of civil liberties represented a crucial compromise between 
governmental regulation, which was “necessary for an orderly society,” and the 
unbounded freedom of nature.  More basically, the rights to speak freely, to 
practice one’s religion, to assemble peaceably and to petition government for the 
redress of grievances were essential to a functioning democracy.  They applied 
with equal force to “the business man and the laborer.”118 Here, then, was the 
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progressive vision of civil liberties, grafted onto a prosecutorial model of civil 
liberties enforcement.  
From his first day in office, it was clear that Murphy would make civil 
liberties a priority.  Shortly after his confirmation, his special assistant in charge 
of public relations helped him arrange a radio program on the protection of civil 
liberties by the Federal Government.119 He told Roger Baldwin that the subject 
was “one of the things that interest[ed him] most keenly,” and that the opportunity 
to pursue it was one of the “great satisfactions” of his service as Attorney 
General. Indeed, he was “anxious that the weight and influence of the Department 
of Justice should be a force for the preservation of the people’s liberties.”120 
On February 3, one month after he was sworn in, Murphy’s office made an 
announcement.  Within the Criminal Division of the Department of Justice, a new 
entity had been established, to be known as the Civil Liberties Unit. Its principal 
function was to prosecute violations of the constitutional and statutory provisions 
“guaranteeing civil rights to individuals.”121 In particular, it would pursue cases of 
beatings and violence, denial of workers’ rights under the NLRA, and deprivation 
of freedom of speech and assembly.122  Murphy explained that in a democracy, 
the enforcement of law entailed the “aggressive protection of the fundamental 
rights inherent in a free people.” The Civil Liberties Unit, consistent with the 
recommendations of the La Follette Committee,123 would undertake “vigilant 
action” in ensuring that those rights were respected.124 For the first time, it would 
throw the “full weight of the Department” behind the “blessings of liberty, the 
spirit of tolerance, and the fundamental principles of democracy.” In Murphy’s 
estimation, the creation of the Civil Liberties Unit was “one of the most 
significant happenings in American legal history.”125 
At the first nationwide gathering of U.S. Attorneys in Washington, D.C., 
Murphy enjoined federal prosecutors to wield their power responsibly—to 
enforce the civil rights statutes “not just for some of the people but for all of 
them,” “no matter how humble.”126 Civil liberties, he told them, were more 
important than at any previous time in history. The Depression had brought with it 
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“the usual demands for repression of minorities,” and it was up to the federal 
government to stave off the rampant incursions.127 
Murphy’s plans for the Civil Liberties Unit were ambitious. Among other 
functions, it would alert local officials that the federal government would not 
tolerate arbitrary and abusive conduct, alone or in conjunction with private 
interests.128 It would also raise awareness and influence public opinion. Murphy 
was adamant that the federal government could “take the initiative,” but it could 
not “do the whole job.” The problem was partly jurisdictional; some rights 
inhered in individuals as residents of the separate states, and they could not be 
vindicated by federal authorities. The threats to American freedom came not only 
from city ordinances and the arbitrary exercise of state power, but from mob 
murder, lynchings, and vigilante violence.  More basically, however, “the great 
protector of civil liberty, the final source of its enforcement” was the “invincible 
power of public opinion.”129 The courts could provide a remedy for lawlessness, 
but they could not prevent its taking hold.   
In the immediate term, the Civil Liberties Unit had a concrete program. It 
would study and evaluate (and eventually prosecute under) the potential 
constitutional and statutory provisions applicable to civil rights enforcement, 
including laws prohibiting kidnapping, peonage, and mail fraud.130  The most 
important of the potential causes of action, at least for the time being, were under 
the Reconstruction era civil rights statutes, Title 18, Sections 51 and 52 of the 
criminal code.131  The Department expected to make generous use of the statutes, 
though it recognized their limitations. Section 52 was applicable only to 
deprivations of civil liberties under color of State laws.  It also suffered “from the 
malady of old age”; after many years of disuse, it was likely to face significant 
resistance.  Section 51 was similarly limited in its usefulness. It was passed to rein 
in the Ku Klux Klan, “and by reason of that fact, together with its severe 
punishment, it [was] a somewhat difficult statute, for psychological reasons, to 
prosecute under.” Moreover, although it permitted prosecution for violation of 
constitutional rights, few constitutional provisions could be construed to limit 
private action. Finally, both sections faced an additional obstacle, in that both 
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criminalized conduct in violation of rights “secured by” the Constitution or 
federal statutes. Defendants were apt to argue that Section 51 applied only to 
rights “created,” not “guaranteed,” by the Constitution, and that the rights of free 
speech and assembly preexisted the federal government.132  In light of these 
obstacles, the Civil Liberties Unit expected to make recommendations for “some 
modern legislation on civil rights.”133  
Within its first month of operation several hundred complaints were referred 
to the Civil Liberties Unit, including lynchings, interference with meetings, illegal 
police practices, deportations, and voting rights violations.134 The Department 
also contemplated prosecutions under Section 51 for violations by employers of 
the Wagner Act.135 That program seemingly received judicial sanction with the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Hague v. CIO, which the Department regarded as a 
strong endorsement of the Civil Rights Act.136 The Court’s interpretation of the 
jurisdictional and private action provisions were an apparent invitation for 
criminal prosecutions under Sections 51 and 52.137  The Department of Justice 
read the Court’s decision in Hague to mean that “if a Federal statute otherwise 
constitutional gives a private right to a citizen, Section 51 will serve for 
prosecution of any group of persons who attempt to take it away from him.”  This 
reasoning arguably applied to private acts of violence affecting statutory rights 
“under the recently extended commerce clause.” The NLRA was the most 
prominent such example,138 and the CIO quickly announced that it would “request 
the Department of Justice to take steps for criminal prosecution of all who 
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interfere with its organizing activities by violating the civil rights of workers.”139 
For a time, the Department vigorously pursued the new strategy, albeit with 
uneven results.140 
Within a few years, however, the Department abandoned its ambitious 
program in favor of a more manageable task. In 1941, the Civil Liberties Unit was 
renamed the Civil Rights Section. Although the terms “civil liberties” and “civil 
rights” were often used interchangeably during this period, the new nomenclature 
reflected a shift in the unit’s priorities from industrial labor to race.  During the 
1940s, the CRS focused on economic justice for African Americans, eschewing 
the type of formal equality arguments that would mark the NAACP’s litigation 
strategy in the run-up to Brown. v. Board of Education.141 Still, the claims the 
CRS took up were those of desperate black farmworkers, not the powerful unions 
of the new labor regime. Rescuing the country’s most vulnerable workers from 
conditions close to slavery threatened America’s racial hierarchy, a goal of patent 
historical importance. Nonetheless, the CRS considered its new commitments, 
like its new name, to be less “radical” and more politically palatable than its 
earlier path.142   
In any case, the continued validity of the state action doctrine made earlier 
proposals to pursue claims against individual employers for interference with 
labor activity unfeasible.  The Fourteenth Amendment did not reach individual 
action, as the CRS well understood.143 The state action requirement expressed in 
such cases as Cruikshank and Wheeler meant that Section 51 was inapplicable to 
“the great mass of civil liberties cases” the Department would otherwise have 
pursued. In 1939, Assistant Attorney General O. John Rogge reported that the 
Criminal Division was evaluating those cases to determine whether they 
represented “sound law.” If they did not, the Civil Liberties Unit would have “no 
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hesitation” in asking the Supreme Court to overrule them.144 The Supreme Court, 
however, declined the offer, and a legislative solution was by that time off the 
table.145  Even if authorization were possible, CRS reservations may have stood in 
the way. Robert Jackson, Murphy’s successor as Attorney General (and his future 
colleague on the Supreme Court), was skeptical of a state-centered approach.  
“Compared with [the] rather narrow powers to advance civil rights,” he reflected, 
“the possibilities that the Department of Justice by misuse of power will invade 
civil rights really gives me more concern.”146  
 
III. The Uncertain Stakes of Civil Liberties Enforcement 
During the late New Deal, a broad range of government actors and private 
organizations openly endorsed civil liberties. Indeed, the federal government 
contained multiple entities explicitly committed to securing them, including a 
Senate committee and Department of Justice unit with the term “civil liberties” in 
their names.  There were, however, essential differences in the ways that the 
various actors understood their underlying objectives. That is, congruence at the 
level of rhetoric belies a growing distance between competing conceptions of civil 
liberties’ substantive sweep, as well as methods of civil liberties enforcement. The 
question for this Part is the extent to which those variations tracked institutional 
lines.  
Scholars of legal change have long asked which institutions are best suited 
to advancing particular rights. Judicial enthusiasts cite the ability of courts and 
constitutional victories to reshape cultural understandings, resist popular 
pressures, and energize potential supporters at relatively low cost.  Critics counter 
that court-based constitutionalism privileges individual over collective rights, de-
radicalizes social movements, and alienates the organizational base. Champions 
of grass-roots organizing, political activism, and interest group pluralism charge 
that resources devoted to litigation could be spent more productively on 
mobilizing, lobbying, or influencing administrative actors on behalf of broader 
goals.   
Meanwhile, accounts of popular constitutionalism evaluate the influence of 
public opinion on judicial decisions construing constitutional rights. In doing so, 
they assume—often implicitly, and sometimes explicitly—that legislative and 
administrative actors are inherently more responsive to popular pressures.147 
Similarly, the countermajoritarian difficulty presumes that the laws and policies 
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subjected to judicial review more closely approximate democratic consensus than 
the decisions that strike them down.148  Above all, there is a broad consensus that 
constitutional interpretation in the federal courts restrains the state, in contrast to a 
reliance on government power in the political branches.149 
The history of civil liberties during the New Deal presents something of a 
natural experiment with respect to these claims. In this moment of profound 
uncertainty and possibility, meaningful alternatives to judicial review were 
proposed and tested. Institutions formulated their own distinctive approached to 
defining and enforcing civil liberties commitments.  Observers debated which 
were best.  
Unsurprisingly, those committed to a labor interventionist view of civil 
liberties were relatively hostile to the courts. Even as he championed the Senate 
Civil Liberties Committee, Robert La Follette favored a constitutional amendment 
to curtail judicial review. He argued that “no kind of legal guaranty has ever been 
able to protect minorities from the hatreds and intolerances let loose when an 
economic system breaks down.”150  That assessment diverged increasingly from 
the progressive civil liberties vision. It found echoes in a statement by the leftist 
International Juridical Association (and reproduced as a pamphlet by the National 
Lawyers Guild), which concluded that “there can be no true enforcement of the 
Bill of Rights in the interests of persons instead of wealth, except by the elected 
representatives of the people.”151 
Many New Dealers regarded Congress as the institution most responsive to 
majoritarian impulses and the judiciary as the most insulated, with administrative 
agencies somewhere in between.152 They doubted the will or power of the courts 
to create labor rights, and they assumed that administrative actors were more apt 
to invoke state power on behalf of rights claimants against private abuse. In the 
face of contending constitutional claims, they called upon Congress to curtail 
employers’ use of economic weapons, with the hope of tipping the constitutional 
balance from property to speech and association and from the rights of employers 
to the rights of labor. While these assumptions and aspirations were based in part 
on prevailing political alignments, it may be that some have generalizable 
significance. 
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To be sure, it is always dangerous to extrapolate from historical cases. At 
the level of discrete institutions, there is simply too much noise: strong 
personalities, budget constraints, idiosyncratic preferences. In short, there are too 
many shocks and too much contingency to justify generalization. That problem is 
all the more acute where, as here, the interval of observation is short; in light of 
rapid political retrenchment, opportunities for experimentation were quickly 
foreclosed.  
Take the NLRB.  Although Congress justified the Wagner Act on the basis 
of industrial stability as well as workers’ rights, the historical evidence points 
strongly to the primacy of the latter in early understandings and enforcement.153 
The principal threat to labor’s civil liberties came from private sources, that is, 
employers. In combating private abuses, industrial unions hitched themselves to 
the enforcement powers of the state. Notwithstanding their caution in court, they 
routinely cloaked their demands in constitutional language. If any institution held 
out the promise of a distinct, extra-court constitutionalism this was it.  
By the late 1930s, however, it was evident that the agency’s partiality 
toward labor—and by extension, its aggressive enforcement of labor’s rights—
would not last. The NLRB never fully realized the vision of civil liberties that its 
early leadership espoused. On some accounts, that failure flowed from 
institutional constraints. In stark contrast to the sympathetic treatment of 
legislation and regulation securing civil rights, labor scholars have often argued 
that a state-centered approach is inherently accommodationist. They have 
reasoned that agencies are subject to regulatory capture, and that within a 
capitalist economy, the NLRB was bound to capitulate to industrial interests.  
If one takes seriously the NLRB’s conception of its mandate as a civil 
liberties project, then its treatment of workers’ rights during the 1940s makes a 
neat counterpoint to the liberal civil liberties vision. After all, the courts assumed 
a largely deferential stance toward the NLRB in the 1940s. Certainly the members 
of the NLRB were acutely aware of the Administrative Procedure Act, along with 
the ever-present and increasing threat of judicial review. Still, labor historians 
have amply documented the Board’s hasty retreat from its early ambitions.  In 
place of fundamental rights, the new NLRB emphasized industrial pluralism. The 
strike quickly gave way to collective bargaining.154 The NLRB of the 1940s put 
more stock in stabilizing production than in equalizing the bargaining power 
between workers and their employers. 
After a wave of powerful labor activity in the wake of World War II, 
Congress would pass the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947 over President Truman’s veto. 
By then, there was broad-based agreement that the labor movement had grown 
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too strong and too reckless. A rare holdout, the ACLU denounced Taft-Hartley as 
a “direct violation of labor’s rights” and cautioned that the act’s provisions were 
“fraught with peril to the maintenance of civil liberties in labor disputes.”155  It 
described the popular desire, expressed in the 1946 elections, to break free of the 
“irritating shackles” of state control and to reinstate “the presumably sound 
leadership of private business.” The statute accomplished that goal in part by 
altering the substantive provisions of the NLRA, and in part by buttressing the 
supervisory role of the courts. The new skepticism toward state economic 
regulation had “produced an atmosphere increasingly hostile to the liberties of 
organized labor, the political left and many minorities.”156 In other words, 
Americans had forgotten that curbing state power might undermine, rather than 
buttress, constitutional rights.  
Historians have characterized Taft-Hartley as little more than an 
afterthought. Perhaps the NLRB’s state-centered approach dulled organized 
labor’s radical edge, as critics have alleged.157 No doubt politics played a part as 
well. Even before the Second World War, the rightward shift within Congress and 
in public opinion led to changes in personnel at the NLRB, which in turn 
tempered the agency’s pro-labor stance. To be sure, the NLRB continued to police 
employers’ unfair labor practices, and the right to organize was firmly entrenched. 
Union density would not peak until the 1950s, and it would take decades for labor 
to register the depth of its subsequent decline. Still, by 1947, the labor 
interventionist vision of civil liberties had long since lost its bite, within Congress 
and the NLRB just as much as the courts.  
In fact, it was arguably in the judiciary—where decision-makers were most 
insulated from rapidly shifting politics—that the progressive, labor 
interventionist, and radical visions of civil liberties coexisted longest.158 Even as 
they clashed in the legislative and administrative arenas, the various civil liberties 
constituencies made common ground in the courts. For a time, robust First 
Amendment protection for labor activity seemed plausible. Thornhill and Carlson 
all but collapsed the radical, labor interventionist, and progressive visions into a 
unitary celebration of labor’s rights. Just as quickly, however, the Supreme Court 
pulled back from the transformative potential of such decisions. By the 1940s, it 
read civil liberties through a liberal lens that privileged the Bill of Rights.    
By the early 1940s, then, a new, liberal vision of civil liberties commanded 
substantial, though not absolute, consensus across institutions. That vision 
regarded the state as hostile and valorized the checking power of the courts. It 
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shared the radicals’ call for a neutral state. It shared the progressives’ concern for 
robust policy debate. It shared the conservatives’ reliance on judicially 
enforceable rights. Only the labor interventionists were excluded from its domain.  
It is impossible fully to disentangle institutional explanations from external 
political pressures. It is likely that the two were closely linked. I argue elsewhere 
that the new liberal commitment was a compromise between competing 
constituencies and advocacy groups, all of whom shared an aversion to state 
power in the realm of expressive freedom.  Radicals feared and predicted that the 
state would turn against them before long. Progressives valued deliberative 
openness in formulating and legitimating social and economic policy. 
Conservatives, for the first time, had reason to fear that the state suppression of 
speech would undermine their prerogatives, and that a laissez-faire approach to 
the First Amendment would redound to their benefit. Whatever the causal chain, 
the moment for experimentation quickly passed. Less than five years after the 
ACLU issued its equivocal assessment of judicial review, the organization 
declared resolutely that its “battleground [was] chiefly in the courts.”159  Its 
volunteer attorneys had carried “scores of civil liberties issues” to the Supreme 
Court of the United States, “where decisions in case after case [had] firmly 
established the interpretations of the Bill of Rights which the Union supports.”160 
Given the rapidity of this shift and the copious confounding variables, what 
lessons can we derive from the proliferation of institutional mechanisms for the 
enforcement of civil liberties before the new consensus crystalized?  
The first is the basic historical insight that alternative paths existed. The 
liberal vision of civil liberties familiar to us today was not the only or, necessarily, 
the preferable possibility. Some New Deal officials rejected state-constraining 
constitutionalism in favor of legislative or administrative efforts to secure labor’s 
rights. Others accepted a central role for the Bill of Rights but resisted the premise 
that courts were best suited to enforce its provisions. In investigating, legislating, 
and litigating, they understood themselves to be legitimate stewards of First 
Amendment freedoms.   
Second, regardless of their substantive views, New Deal actors had a 
capacious understanding of the opportunities for collaboration across institutions.  
In framing its prosecutorial program, the Civil Liberties Unit of the Department of 
Justice responded to and pushed the limits of state action doctrine as construed by 
the courts. The NLRB looked to the La Follette Committee to expand and 
vindicate its power. And the judiciary acknowledged legislative and 
administrative priorities in assessing the appropriate scope of First Amendment 
rights.  Sometimes that meant accommodating expressive freedom to political 
                                                
159 American Civil Liberties Union, Presenting the American Civil Liberties Union, Inc., 
November 1941 (American Civil Liberties Union 1941). 
160 American Civil Liberties Union, Presenting the American Civil Liberties Union, April 
1947 (American Civil Liberties Union 1947), 5. 
   
45 
 
judgments about public safety or national security, as it does today.161 Sometimes, 
the Court invoked changing legislative priorities in expanding the First 
Amendment to admit new activity, like labor picketing, into the ambit of First 
Amendment protection.162  
Third, it is a crucial feature of this period that extra-judicial judgments about 
civil liberties were not consigned to the shadows of court decisions. In other 
words, when the NLRB reasoned that the right of workers to organize trumped the 
right of employers to distribute anti-union literature, it was not operating strictly 
in the interstices of existing doctrine, nor was it merely attempting to influence 
judicial reasoning.163 Rather, in a moment of profound constitutional change, it 
imagined itself as a coequal partner in the New Deal realignment of powers and 
rights. Not only had the Supreme Court signaled a new deference to the political 
branches, but President Roosevelt had proven willing to challenge the entire 
enterprise of judicial review.  And despite the failure of the court-packing plan, 
there was still considerable support for alternative court-curbing measures if 
circumstances so required. Constitutionalism outside the courts was never 
unconstrained, but non-judicial actors in the late New Deal operated with a degree 
of independence unprecedented at the time and unparalleled since. How they 
exercised their perceived power offers a glimpse of what an unmediated extra-
court constitutionalism might accomplish, at least in the First Amendment 
context.  
These were new and momentous developments. It was not that earlier 
government actors were autocratic in their suppression of dissent. On the 
contrary, they had often exercised their discretion to accommodate disfavored 
speakers and views.  Congress had considered free speech in debating such 
measures as the Espionage and Sedition Acts, and it had expressly avoided 
provisions that were perceived to go too far.164  Occasionally, the Department of 
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Justice had declined prosecution in cases involving political agitation. Various 
federal agencies, including the post office, the customs service, and the War 
Department, had considered constitutional and policy constraints in formulating 
and administering their policies.165  
By the same token, the federal government of the 1930s garnered its share 
of criticism with respect to the Bill of Rights. The Roosevelt administration was 
responsible for a massive expansion of secret surveillance by the FBI, and Frank 
Murphy’s justice department authorized spurious prosecutions of radical 
dissenters.166  As for Congress, the Smith Act prohibitions on “subversive 
activities” and the House Committee on Un-American Activities quickly 
supplanted the LaFollette Civil Liberties Committee and its legislative program as 
the signature contributions of the prewar period.  
Such qualifications notwithstanding, the New Deal ushered in a 
thoroughgoing revision of the relationship between state power and the Bill of 
Rights. At least since the Palmer Raids, that relationship had been primarily 
oppositional. When the federal government entertained civil liberties claims, it 
was to constrain executive discretion or moderate repressive laws, not to curb 
abuses by local governments or private actors. Put differently, state actors 
operated in the shadow of the Constitution, as they ordinarily do today.167 
Sometimes, they expressly limited or altered their policies to avoid running afoul 
of the First Amendment; constitutional interpretation, to the extent they engaged 
in it, served to cabin instead of empower them.  
In the 1930s, in a marked departure from its historic practices, the state 
marshaled its resources to protect rather than suppress the rights of unpopular 
minorities as well as the channels of protest and dissent.168 In all reaches of 
government, administrators and policymakers professed allegiance to civil 
liberties as a central value of American democracy, and they deployed state power 
to effectuate civil libertarian ends. 
The short window of experimentation and the swift ideological 
reconfiguration has obscured the significance of these alternative enforcement 
regimes.  Their influence, however, persisted for decades. Perhaps there is no 
better example than the brief for the United States as amicus curiae in Brown v. 
Board of Education. “Few Americans believe that the government should pursue 
a laissez-faire policy in the field of civil rights, or that it adequately discharges its 
duty to the people so long as it does not itself intrude on their civil liberties,” the 
                                                
165 Weinrib, Liberal Compromise; Kessler.  
166 Samuel Walker, Presidents and Civil Liberties from Wilson to Obama: A Story of Poor 
Custodians 96-97 (Cambridge 2012),. 
167 This is the interpretive process ordinarily addressed in the literature on constitutionalism 
outside the courts.  
168 During Reconstruction, the federal government had endeavored (unevenly) to protect the 
rights of African Americans in the South. The New Deal efforts expanded on that precedent in 
creating an institutional structure to promote the dissemination of unorthodox views and to 
insulate dissent more broadly.  
   
47 
 
brief declared in language strongly reminiscent of New Deal civil liberties 
enforcement. It is possible, of course, that the government’s formulation was a 
throwback to a prior era. Still, it is noteworthy that the brief invoked popular 
support for a principle that seems incongruous with civil liberties claims today: a 
“general acceptance of an affirmative government obligation to insure respect for 
fundamental human rights.”169 
Finally, it is worth underscoring that the liberal civil liberties vision that 
prevailed across institutions by the early 1940s unequivocally privileged the 
courts. Whether the courts, in turn, favored the liberal vision remains an open 
question. Put simply, it is unclear whether the judiciary embraced the anti-state, 
court-centered approach because it was most consistent with its institutional 
interests and competencies, or whether the courts, like their administrative and 
legislative counterparts, were channeling broader developments.170  The answer is 
elusive, just as it is difficult to discern from the historical record whether the 
Constitutional Revolution flowed from jurisprudential or doctrinal concerns as 
opposed to court-packing pressures or popular demand. In the late New Deal, 
economic contraction, hostility toward labor, and the rise of totalitarianism abroad 
all abetted the liberal civil liberties vision.  But it is telling, at the very least, that 
so many actors across the political spectrum believed—some optimistically, some 
with real trepidation—that the judiciary was bound to serve a checking function 
on state power and labor rights.  
 
Conclusion 
That the architects of the liberal civil liberties vision were deeply ambivalent 
about the institutional mechanisms for rights enforcement has largely been 
forgotten. It is an observation with important implications for debates about extra-
court constitutionalism and the scope of the First Amendment today. As scholars 
and advocates contemplate the allocation of institutional authority to define and 
defend constitutional rights, they would do well to consider the anticipated 
advantages and limitations of the court-based constitutionalism that prevailed.  
I do not mean to overstate this claim. The trans-institutional convergence on 
the liberal vision of civil liberties challenges the assumption that the judicial 
forum is altogether distinctive in its conception of rights, or that the tradeoffs 
entailed in constitutional litigation are limited to its purview. There was more 
ideological variation within institutions and less ideological variation across 
institutions than contemporaries predicted and modern scholars might suppose. 
Indeed, a capacious account of civil liberties lasted longest in the judiciary. 
Today, even as First Amendment scholars lament the judiciary’s stubborn 
adherence to a free marketplace of ideas, labor law scholars query whether unions 
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would not have fared better in the courts.171 
But if institutional distinctions in civil liberties enforcement were less 
apparent than New Dealers might have expected, neither were they 
inconsequential. The effects on civil liberties of domestic economic conditions 
and an imminent World War no doubt dwarfed the impact of institutional 
distinctions. Still, especially outside the labor context, tangible differences 
emerged.  
In the years after the Constitutional Revolution, the federal government 
sought out ways to increase access to competing ideas without favoring particular 
outcomes. That is, government actors developed methods to promote and secure a 
forum for expressive contestation—just as they had created a framework for 
collective bargaining, without prescribing particular results, through the NLRA. 
In 1938, President Roosevelt introduced a discounted postage rate to facilitate the 
circulation of printed matter. ACLU Attorney Morris Ernst, who persuaded 
Roosevelt to adopt the program, proclaimed that it “permitted a flow into the 
market place of great additional diversity of points of view.”172   In 1946, the FCC 
adopted new standards for granting and renewing radio licenses, which required 
stations to allocate time for the discussion of “important public questions” and to 
cover all sides of controversial issues.  In practice, of course, such requirements 
served to increase access by disfavored and marginal speakers; popular and 
commercial speakers were likely already to have ample coverage. The radio 
industry denounced the measures as censorship, but the ACLU disagreed.  If the 
government sought to withhold radio licenses based on its assessment of the 
content of programming, it explained, the station owners had recourse to the 
courts.  As things stood, “[t]he standards fixed provide[d] for more speech, not 
less.”173 Such developments emerged directly out of the New Deal’s more 
ambitious experimentation in civil liberties enforcement.174  
In an era when radical revolution seemed possible—when the goal of labor 
activity was the general strike, not a union contract—minor differences like these 
would have seemed inconsequential. Proponents of the radical civil liberties 
                                                
171 See, eg, Cynthia L. Estlund, The Ossification of American Labor Law, 102 Colum L Rev 
1527 (2002).  
172 See Fred Rodell, “Morris Ernst, New York’s Unlawyerlike Liberal Lawyer is the Censor’s 
Enemy, The President’s Friend,” Life, 21 February 1944. The measure was justified on the basis 
that “in this democracy of ours, unlike the dictatorship lands, we are dedicated to the ever 
increasing extension of a free market in thought as a means to the perpetuation of our national 
ideals. As they burn books abroad, we extend their distribution.” Announcement by National 
Committee to Abolish Postal Discrimination Against Books, Oscar Cox Papers, Franklin D. 
Roosevelt Presidential Library, Hyde Park, N.Y., Alphabetical File, Douglas-Ernst, box 9, folder 
Ernst, Morris; Ernst, “Memorandum for Special Meeting,” 5–6. 
173 American Civil Liberties Union, Radio Programs in the Public Interest (New York: 
American Civil Liberties Union, July 1946). Cf. Red Lion Broadcasting Company v. Federal 
Communications Commission, 395 U.S. 367 (1969).  
174 Even here, institutional distinctions are murky. 1946 was the same year that the Supreme 
Court issued its aberrational decision requiring a private actor to open its property to public 
discussion. Marsh v. Alabama, 326 U.S. 401 (1946). 
   
49 
 
vision naively hoped that a naked right to agitate would pave the way to 
substantive change. Implicit in their position was the confidence that even in an 
unfettered marketplace, their agenda would prevail. By the 1940s, employers 
understood that no free exchange in ideas existed.  They understood that a right to 
free speech would almost invariably favor those with superior resources. As 
Nathan Greene (co-author with Felix Frankfurter of The Labor Injunction) 
cautioned in relation to anti-union propaganda, employer speech amounts to “a 
protected commodity in a monopoly market.”175 On this view, it was not that New 
Deal institutions de-radicalized the labor-friendly civil liberties visions; it was the 
liberal civil liberties vision that de-radicalized the New Deal state. That is, what 
was determinative was ideological contestation and compromise, not institutional 
enforcement.  
Then again, a young Roger Baldwin might have suggested that the radicals’ 
mistake was to trust in state institutions at all. The story of civil liberties between 
the Depression and World War II conforms to a truism of labor advocacy during 
the Progressive Era: namely, that courts, no less than administrators or 
legislatures, are creatures of the state.  Indeed, the notion that the Supreme Court 
could have stretched the First Amendment to encompass labor’s most coercive 
tactics seems fanciful in retrospect. Even prospectively, many within the labor 
movement considered the judicial strategy to be misguided. At the dawn of the 
New Deal, the architects of the modern civil liberties movement had pitted the 
administrative enforcement of civil liberties against labor’s collective power 
rather than the courts. Theirs was not liberal constitutionalism, administrative 
constitutionalism, or even popular constitutionalism. They defended civil liberties 
as rights prior to the Constitution, enforceable by “economic power and organized 
pressure alone.”176 
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